

**Ethio - USA partnership in counter-terrorism in the Horn of Africa: Challenges and Prospects.**

**By: Yodit Hailemariam and Fekadu Dagnaw**

## Table of Contents

<b>Contents</b>	<b>Page</b>
1.1 Introduction .....	4
1.2. Statement of the Problem .....	7
1.3. Objectives of the Research.....	5
1.3.1 General Objective .....	5
1.3.2 Specific Objectives .....	5
1.4. Research Questions.....	6
1.5. Research Methods and Methodology.....	6
1.6. Scope of the Study .....	7
1.7. Significance of the study .....	7
1.8 Limitations of the Research.....	8
1.9 Organization of the Research .....	9
References.....	10

## **Abstract**

*This study focuses on the Ethio-US relation on counter terrorism endeavors in the Horn of Africa especially on security related issues and their policies and strategies on countering terrorism. Besides; it focuses on the challenges and prospects, effectiveness of their cooperation on defending terrorism in the Horn of Africa. The study followed a qualitative approach that considered necessary for this kind of research which deals with underlying issues that are usually cannot be understood in a quantifiable manner. The data collection process mainly depended up on secondary data and primary data is employed to support those data. It attempts to underline the potentials that are associated with terrorism in the Horn of Africa specifically Ethio-USA partnership in fighting terrorism in the region. In addition to a brief historical flashback of terrorism in the region, the potential of the Horn in terms of terrorism is associated with the underlying factors like poverty, regional conflict, the presence of large but marginalized and dissatisfied Muslim population, Somalia's state failure, etc. Moreover, it looks in to the Ethio- USA counters terrorism efforts and programs that include CJTF-HOA and other less official and secret operations. Finally, it attempts to identify gaps in the Ethio-US relation and their policies in combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa by concentrating on the underlying factors affecting the bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism move.*

*As findings of this study, has two parts; one is about terrorism like its meaning from different view. The term 'terrorism' comes from the Latin word 'terrere', this means to fear or to tremble. Terrorism is not a new phenomenon because 'it has long been a method of violent action to achieve political goals'. Accordingly, the word terrorism has been used since the early times of recorded history while there have been killings with or without political, religious and ideological relations at the time. Nowadays, it is seen internationally as a serious challenge for national security; not only in Ethiopia. And see about Ethio-USA relation on countering terrorism in the horn of Africa including their terrorist incident and their response on terrorism attack in the Horn. Also include challenges and prospect of the Ethio-USA cooperation on countering terrorism in this region.*

## 1.1 Introduction

October 2013 following al-Shabaab's failed bombing attempt in Addis Ababa, Ethiopian security intensified counterterrorism efforts in 2014. Although Ethiopia suffered no terrorist attacks during the year, the persistent risks posed by al-Shabaab dominated the Ethiopian government's security posture. This threat contributed to the Ethiopia National Defense Force (ENDF) joining the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) at the beginning of the year. The integration of Ethiopia's forces into AMISOM was a milestone in the multinational effort against international terrorists, since ENDF counterterrorism operations in Somalia have been instrumental in preventing al-Shabaab's dispersion into Ethiopia. Terrorists are likely to try to carry out attacks in Ethiopia. Attacks could be indiscriminate including in places visited by foreigners, transport hubs, hotels, restaurants, bars and places of worship and during major gatherings like religious or sporting events. Accessed on <http://cps.org/2009/07/anti-terrorism-legislation-available-at-3/18/2018>.

The authorities of Ethiopia have successfully disrupted a number of planned attacks and made a number of arrests. In November 2016 eight Somali nationals were found guilty of trying to carry out terror attacks in public areas in Addis Ababa and jailed for nine years. A number of indigenous Ethiopian and ethnic Somali groups which operate in Ethiopia are actively engaged in a militant campaign against the Ethiopian government, with most of their activity centered on the Ogaden region (<http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm>). Similarly Somali Special Forces are accused of committing Human right violation in Somali Regional State of Ethiopia.

The military intervention of Ethiopia in Somalia in December 2006 with the 'invitation' of the TFG was given a tacit support by the United States which considers the leadership of the ICU is linked with al-Qaeda. When asked by the Joint Hearing of the US House of Representatives about ICU, the former Assistance Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer replied that even though the ICU is a heterogeneous group of courts' there are jihadist and hard-liner militants that provides a safe haven for terrorists in Mogadishu and the rest of Somalia.

Furthermore, in her prepared statement for the testimony, she claimed that terrorists like Abu Tahla Al Sudani, Fazul Abdullah Mohamed, and Saleh Ali Saleh Nebhan which are

responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings and the 2002 Hotel and attempted airliner attacks have taken refuge in Somalia. The ICU was indeed a heterogeneous group as it was described by the Assistant Secretary.

According to Markus V. Hoene, the ICU is a collage of about fourteen courts which includes some extremist elements with jihadist and militant agenda. It included groups like al-Shabaab which started as ICU's youth wing with 400 fighters and reached 2000 just before Ethiopian invasion; former AIAI members who prefer to keep low profile after 9/11; MajumaUlema which started by religious leaders (Ulema) in order to provide security for Mogadishu neighborhoods with a vision of establishing an Islamic state; and AhluSunnaWalJama'a (ASWJ) which was an offshoot of MajumaUlema in order to help the late warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed in his quest to defend the traditional Somali Islamic practices from foreign, and especially Salafi/Wahabi encroachment'.

Hoene also states that the ICU also included diverse individuals like Haji Abukar Omar Adaani who is from Hawiye/Abgal/Warsageeli sub-clan who is considered the financier of the ICU and an established businessman whose major interest is to protect his business; Hassan DahirAweys from Hawiye/HabrGedir/Ayr/Ayaanle who was a former Somali army colonel in SiadBarre See Jendayi Frazer's testimony entitled Somalia: Expanding Crisis in the Horn of Africa' in a Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Operations and the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives,(Hoene, June 29, 2006).

September 11, 2001 attacks in New York and Washington D.C. which claimed thousands of lives put struggle against international terrorism to the fore front of United States' (US) security agenda. It has been battling terrorism in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle East, and South East Asia. In addition to these regions, the Horn of Africa is given special attention by the US Counter terrorism efforts because East Africa is perhaps the most strategic vis-à-vis the current Conflict against Islamist extremists' (Chua, 2008:38). According to Kagwanja, (2006:74), there are several reasons for this:

*First, the region's geographical proximity and bonds of history with the Middle East facilitated the movements of terrorist agents within and across the*

*two regions. Second, countries in the region are either predominantly Muslim or have significant Muslim minorities ... [which may] expose them to sectarian conflicts and international terrorism. Third, paradoxically, the expansion of democratic space from the 1990s emboldened activism inspired by radical Islamic ideas among disaffected Muslim minorities, particularly at the coast.... Fourth, a mix of widespread poverty, chronic underdevelopment a deep sense of marginalization, accentuated by negative forces of economic globalization, enabled Islamists to export their ideas and to win allies among impoverished Muslim minorities and desperate refugees.*

Okumu argues that there are number of reasons for the Horn of Africa's vulnerability to terrorism ranging from the region's proximity to the failed state of Somalia and weak counter terrorism and police capabilities to porous borders and bad governance' (Okumu& Botha, 2007:63) which are conducive situations for terrorist activities.

The US focus is manifested by different measures. Prior to 9/11, there were two major terrorist attacks against the U.S. nationals and interests in East Africa: the US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 were allegedly orchestrated by Al-Qaeda operatives. After 9/11, renewed focus was brought to bear on East Africa and U.S. intelligence developed information that training, equipment, and fighters linked to Al Qaeda were coming from the region' (West 2005:3). The situation in Somalia, the complete collapse of the state, is also a concern for the U.S. for it appears to be an Islamicradical's perfect storm and a safe haven'(Rotberg2005:23).

This study will try to assess, and analyze Ethio-USA partnership on counter terrorism in theHornof Africa: Challenges and prospects. Terrorism is also manipulated by governments for their own purpose of state security and regime survival which sometimes is in collision course with basic human and civil rights. This study, in general, will try to examine Ethio- USA Partnership in fighting terrorism in terms of cooperation in bilateral relations, protection of their territory and military involvement and other initiatives of its overall effect in the Horn of Africa and also its efficacy in countering terrorism in this sub region the Horn of Africa.

## **1.2. Statement of the Problem**

According to Woldeselase (2010) the Horn of Africa is considered one of the potential regions in the world vulnerable to terrorist threats especially against the United States and the West by being a base and a transit point for these terrorists. The sub region is not new for terrorist attacks. The Horn of Africa is not a stable region. The extent of cooperation in fighting terrorism, protection of territories, and negotiation of Ethio-US Partnership on the terrorist threat in the Horn of Africa must be investigated and assessed in order to strengthen the unity of the two countries (Woldesilasse.2010).

Various studies were undertaken regarding terrorism and the threats its impacts on the security of nations. For example, WoldeSelase (2010) studied about terrorism in Ethiopia and the horn of Africa: threat, Impact and response. Gedion (2011) also studied on the USA military involvement in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa. Similarly, Gatuiku (2016) studied on countering terrorism in the horn of Africa focusing on Kenya. But, there are scanty literatures on Ethio – USA partnership in countering terrorism in the Horn of Africa in general and its repercussion on the domestic political milieu of Ethiopia in particular. Therefore, this study will contribute for filling the existing knowledge and empirical gaps.

## **1.3. Objectives of the Research**

### **1.3.1 General Objective**

The Main objective of this study will focus on assessing and analyzing the challenges and prospects of Ethio-USA partnership on counter terrorism move in the Horn of Africa.

### **1.3.2 Specific Objectives**

The specific objectives of this study:

- 1) To assess the historical trajectory of Ethio-USA partnership in the area of terrorism in the horn of Africa.
- 2) To identify the challenges of Ethio- USA partnership in fighting against terrorism in the Horn of Africa.let you separate challenges and prospects.

- 3) To evaluate the effectiveness of Ethio-USA bilateral cooperation strategies in fighting against terrorism in the Horn Africa.
- 4) To analyze the prospects of Ethio-USA cooperation in fighting terrorism on domestic politics of Ethiopia.

#### **1.4. Research Questions**

This study attempts to answer the following research questions:

- 1) What is the historical trajectory of Ethio-USA Partnership in the area of security in the Horn of Africa?
- 2) What are the challenges of Ethio-USA Partnership in fighting against terrorism in the horn of Africa?
- 3) How effective was the Ethio-USA bilateral cooperation strategies in fighting terrorism at the Horn of Africa?
- 4) What are the prospects of Ethio-USA cooperation in fighting terrorism on domestic politics of Ethiopia?

#### **1.5. Research Methods and Methodology**

This study will be a qualitative study which will attempt to describe the ETHIO-USA Partnership in counter terrorism in the Horn of Africa and try to make an understanding about the research questions that are better handled in a qualitative approach since the topic involves a lot of underlying and complex issues that cannot be possibly measured in quantitative methods and Statistical data. Qualitative research aims to address questions concerned with developing an understanding of the meaning and experience dimension of humans' lives and social worlds' (Fossey et al, 2002:717).

Since the issue of terrorism and counter terrorism heavily interrelated with the social world and human beings who have coin different meanings to different phenomena like terrorism, important to use qualitative methodology.

It is evident that the issue of terrorism is a difficult one in such a way that people cannot define it in a universal manner because it involves different points of view from different people, states, sub state groups, international organizations etc. Researches concerned with terrorism, thus, are better handled in qualitative manner in order to identify the meanings and underlying reasons which are very difficult to quantify and use statistical methods in order to make an understanding and reach a plausible conclusion.

The research will be a descriptive study, because it sets out the relevant research tools to describe and to interpret what the problem looks like at individuals, groups, institutions, and methods and materials in order to describe, compare, contrast, classify, analyze and interpret the entities and the events that constitute the various fields of inquiry and describing the state of Affairs as it exists( Kothari, 2004:3)

As a method of data collection, this study will rely on primary and secondary data. To collect primary data, the researchers will conduct key informant interviews. The key informant interview participants will be selected purposively, by considering the interviewees know – how on the issue under study.

The secondary data will be collected from books, journals, Scholarly articles, conference proceedings and also analyzing official Documents, United Nations (UN) Resolutions, speeches, legislations and decisions by different countries and multilateral organizations like IGAD and the United States.

The primary data will be utilized in order to supplement the secondary data. The secondary data is also considered as very important for the collection of data regarding terrorism and counter terrorism; since the issue of terrorism and counter-terrorism requires cross-checking and triangulation of various data sources.

## **1.6. Scope of the Study**

This study will be confined to assessing the ETHIO-USA cooperation in counter - terrorism in the Horn of Africa and its possible consequences on the sub region. The study will focus on the ETHIO-USA partnership in counter terrorism in the horn of Africa.

### **1.7. Significance of the study**

The study will contribute to fill the knowledge gap regarding the issue under study, about the Ethio – USA partnership in fighting against terrorism in the Horn of Africa. It will serve as a base line study for further investigation to other researchers. It will serve for the researchers as a partial fulfillment for the requirements of Bachelor of Arts Degree in Political Science and International Relations.

### **1.8 Limitations of the Research**

This study will not be able to conduct interviews outside Addis Ababa due to budgetary Constraints. or instance, the researchers will not be able to interview Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa officials based in Djibouti. Since they are directly involved in the military aspect of US involvement, interviewing and investigating documents would have filled lots of gaps in the study. In addition, the research cannot investigate many of the terrorist incidents deeply due to time and financial constraints.

### **1.9 Organization of the Research**

This study is structured in four chapters. The first chapter will introduce the general features of the study and also underline what the study is all about. The second chapter deals with conceptual frameworks and literature review. The third chapter focuses on the data presentation and analysis of the collected information from primary and secondary sources. The final chapter gives concluding remarks and recommendations on the findings of the study.

## **Chapter 2 Conceptual and Theoretical Framework**

### **2.1 Conceptual definitions**

This chapter provides definitions and theoretical frameworks for these concepts: terrorism, counter-terrorism, and Ethiopian and Americans counter terrorism strategies. This section clarifies those concepts in relation with the impacts of terrorism in the horn of African geopolitics from domestic politics and USA interests. Finally, the research attempts to address the link between terrorism, counter-terrorism and global war against terrorism from USA-Ethiopian bilateral cooperation perspectives.

### **2.2 Terrorism**

The term 'terrorism' comes from the Latin word 'terrere', this means to fear or to tremble (Hoffman 2006:2-3). Terrorism is not a new phenomenon because 'it has long been a method of violent action to achieve political goals' (Ganor 2009:13). Accordingly, the word terrorism has been used since the early times of recorded history while there have been killings with or without political, religious and ideological relations at the time. Nowadays, it is seen internationally as a serious challenge for national security; not only in Ethiopia. As a turning point terrorism has been most widely discussed and focused by states, media and academics in post September 11 USA attacks (Golder and Williams 2004:270).

However, the definition of terrorism is controversial and scholars define the term differently (Golder and Williams 2004:270). For instance, for Enders and Sandler (2011:3) terrorism is 'premediated threat to use violence by individuals or sub national groups in order to obtain a political or social objective'. For, Hoffman Bruce, terrorism is an 'organized act of violence perceived as directed against society to promote desired outcome by instilling fear in the public at large' (Bruce 2006:1). For, USA State Department, terrorism is 'premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants targeted by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience' (Department of State 2003: xiii). The UN General Assembly's Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, provided definition of terrorism as: 'criminal acts- intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes'.

The above four definitions of terrorism show that though the term is widely used and discussed there is no universally acceptable definition of terrorism. Yet, several attempts have been made at regional and international level to develop a comprehensive legal definition of terrorism but failed (Golder and Williams 2004:270). Despite various and inconsistent definitions of terrorism, the most common definitions are characterized by three key elements: intention to inflict fear, serious acts of violence and compelling government to do or abstain from doing any act (Bantekas and Oette 2013:616). Accordingly, the existing regulations and resolutions relating to specific aspects of terrorism define certain acts and central elements. Each of these three core elements is intended to produce terror in its victims.

The failure to establish accepted definition of terrorism reflects more of political challenge than a legal or semantic challenge (Alston and Goodman 2012:383-4). States and international actors failed to achieve on consensus what constitutes terrorism for political interest. For instance, agreement on whether or not state ban the separatist or armed group or not as a terrorist. As one commentator noted: ‘tell me what you think about terrorism and I will tell you who you are’; ‘I know when I see it’ (Noteboom 2002:553). Similarly, other controversy phrase captured as, ‘one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter’ (Hoffman 2004:934). This implies that being a terrorist and terrorism is a social construction and an action. In-deed, the powers of the state may extend very far and infringe upon fundamental rights and freedom of individuals.

Of course, the act of terrorism has devastating impacts on almost all sets of human rights, rule of law and social values (OHCHR 2008:7). Terrorism has a huge effect on the enjoyment of protected human rights and freedoms whether it was committed by states or non-state actors. This obviously, includes the rights of HRDs. According to Protection International, HRDs were deliberately attacked by politically or religiously driven militants for a response to defender’s work (PI 2015). In practice, defenders work for the defence of women, LGBTI, journalists, land and environment are more focused (ibid). They face a serious risk and planned attacks as a result of their legitimate work. For instance, terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo’s publication resulted in killings of journalists is a response to freedom of expression (FIDH 2015). This implies HRDs sometimes are directly exposed to terrorist attack by individuals or non-state actors, as a result of their commitment to defending the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In

order to combat such distractive act by private parastatal groups state has both rights and duty to protect its own citizens under international human rights law.

However, the response to terrorism must be reconcilable within basic standards of human rights and international law (Hoffman 2004:949). To remain within international human rights framework, states have both the international and regional duty to take necessary steps to punish perpetrators and to prevent terrorism based on measures adopted. The legal response is one of the modalities designed to prevent human rights violations arising from antiterrorism (Wubie 2012:24-25).

Moreover, the absence of accepted legal definition of terrorism resulted in the enactment of restrictive approaches or broader interpretation of ‘acts of terrorism’ in domestic law than is desirable. This affects the debate around what exactly it is being countered through anti-terrorism measures.

### **2.3 Counter-terrorism Measures**

Since 9/11 most states in the world have considered national and international terrorism as a grave threat to their national security. This condition pushed the states to enact, or strengthen their national legal framework or use military response to fight against terrorism (Walzer 2002:2-3). The strategies to counterterrorism measures are widely different across the globe drawing on local political context and the perceived level of threats states face (Hoffman 2004:933). As with terrorism itself, the term counter-terrorism is a controversial concept to define. Rineheart said, ‘there is no universally applicable counter-terrorism policy or strategy (2010:32).

Practically counter-terrorism has not been clearly defined and there are many ‘confusions between empirical conditions on the ground and elusiveness of the phenomenon it seeks to describe’ (Asresahegn 2011:39). This refers the invisible relation between the facts seen on the ground and the principles what the law intended and aimed while enacted. Counter-terrorism operation is also subject to change depending on the nature of the terrorism threat. Thus, Counter-terrorism was complicated due to the differentiation on practical enforcement and problem inherited from controversial definition of terrorism (Shimalis 2014:12). Indeed, both terrorism and counter-terrorism has been an almost inseparable nexus.

In a broad sense, counter-terrorism covers numerous policy areas. Several scholars and institutions have tried to define the concept of counter-terrorism based on the practical activities adopted by different organs. To cite some example, the U.S. Army Field Manual defined counter-terrorism as: ‘operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism’ (Rineheart 2010: 32). This definition is short and more concrete, but includes broad term differentiates nothing with scope, nature and methods of response. This may affect the relevant aspect to be properly regarded for countering terrorism. Omelicheva (2010) delineates counterterrorism as a ‘strategy adopted to protect the public from the violent terrorist action’ (2010:2). This definition also abhorred the system or approach applicable for effective measures against terrorism. It indicates that there is no acceptable counter-terrorism method. The absence of comprehensive measure would result in impeding democracy and conceal the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The experts and scholars of terrorism acknowledged two distinctive approaches to combat terrorism: a military (war) model and a criminal justice system model (Schmid 2004:202, Wilkinson 2006). Their study shows a military model is tendency to struggle against terrorism at all level through warfare. It could respond either in individual states or military coalition on the basis of self defense or prevention mechanism. According to this tactic terrorist attack was framed as an eminent threat to the world’s people and peace, which can only be addressed by a military approach. This approach may involve national, organizational and international military coalitions of individual states and states to fight against terrorism, which later shifted to ‘Global war on terror’ policy to legitimize the counter-terrorism strategy via warfare (Mihir and Gibney 2014:229). Since war entails risk against civilians, this approach may result in wide-range of human and fundamental rights violation. Advocators of this strategy believe that, it is effective response to the terrorist act and threat.

On the other hand, the ‘criminal justice approach- is a legalist framework necessitated to curb terrorism’ (Schmid 2004:202, Wilkinson 2006). This placed with relevancies of law and policy. Criminal justice approach as counterterrorism strategy- justified on the basis of national security laws (Moore and Turner 2005: 47). It is a model that could be applied with the basic principles of international law and requirement of Security Council resolutions related to counter-terrorism

(Asresahegn 2011:40). The UN request states to modify developed legislation or enact new measures that comply with international human rights. Thus, the standardized rule of law and human rights principles coupled with effective counter-terrorism strategy has indispensable potential to eradicate terrorism (Hoffman 2004:954).

## **2.4 Terrorism in the Horn of Africa**

Most scholars agree that Horn of Africa is a highly potential and actual region for the expansion terrorist and extremist groups. It is an important staging area, training center, and a favored place to target U.S. interests. U.S. officials are closely monitoring countries which are vulnerable to terrorist penetration and influence, as well as countries that are sympathetic to these groups (Dagne, 2002; 17 Cooke &Downie, 2010; 67 ).

Following the shot down of the United States military helicopter in 1993 at Black Hawk Down incident which were the part of peace keeping in Somalia, and the bombardment of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 which was linked to Al Qaeda, United States has been concerning about terrorism in the Horn of Africa (West, 2005).

Moreover, after September 9/11 attacks the United States has more focused in the Horn of Africa in order to avoid the sanctuary and expansion of terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa particularly to eliminate Al Qaeda and its wings. Furthermore, the United States intelligence developed information about the training, equipment, and fighters linked to Al Qaeda were coming from the region such as Al-Shabaab (ibid).

According to West, terrorism in East Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa and Yemen, has been of concern to the United States since the early 1990s where in 1993, two military helicopters that were part of the peace keeping mission were shot down in Mogadishu, resulting in deaths of eighteen US soldiers and hundreds of Somalis ( West,2005:3).

But Shinn claims that terrorist activities like the Black September organization assassination of the American ambassador to Sudan, Cleo A. Noel Jr., and his deputy chief of mission, George Curtis Moore, in 1973‘Shinn (2004:36-37) were there before Americans gave attention to terrorism. \_In a revenge attack on Kenya for allowing an Israeli rescue mission to use its facilities to foil the 1976 hijacking of an Air France plane and its 258 passengers the

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) bombed the Jewish-family owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi on 31 December 1980, killing 15 people and injuring 80 others (Kagwanja, 2006:74).

Kagwanja also claims that analysts suspect that Islamic terrorists had a hand in the killing of 18 US army rangers in the Blackhawk Down episode in Mogadishu in 1993 prompting the withdrawal of US troops from the country in March 1994 (Kagwanja, 2006:74). But Ploch claims that the extent of the al-Qaeda ties with the actual perpetrators is unknown (Ploch, 2010:5). Further strengthening Ploch's argument, Moller argues that most analysts dismiss this as highly unlikely and unsubstantiated by any evidence (Moller, 2009:21).

West states that, "to combat terrorism in the greater Horn of Africa, the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was set up in late 2002 in order to confront terrorists directly, to help the nations of the region identify and capture terrorists, and to help the host nations control their ungoverned spaces, especially borders and coastlines (West, 2005:6).

## **2.5 Potential for Threat of Terrorism in the Horn**

For West, Somalia's lack of central government and its largely ungoverned territory and coastline should provide the right mix for a terrorist haven and a source of recruitment for radical Islamists as the perfect storm [which] got everything an Islamic terrorist would want—a long unpatrolled coastline, unpatrolled borders leading to interesting targets, an Islamic country with radical movement, immiseration and desperation (West, 2005:19). As al-Qaeda was attacked and driven out of Afghanistan, Somalia quickly earned a spot on the shortlist of countries that might be targeted in an expanded war on terrorism' (Menkhaus in Rotberg, 2005:38).

But Piombo argues that, terrorist groups tend to use the failed states like Somalia as more as staging ground and transit points, rather than places where the groups build long-term organizational and financial networks (Piombo, 2007:2). Terrorist organizations are not entirely comfortable operating in a failed state, where their own security is in jeopardy, where outside intervention can take place without much public attention and outcry and where various militia can be paid to search them out (Lyman, 2008:3). But Lyman also states that, the worst fears

about Somalia after 9/11 seemed about to become true when Islamic Courts Movement unified control of Mogadishu' ( Lyman,2008:3).

Moller states that, it has become a common place in the US discourse, including the academic literature, that the Horn of Africa (or, more broadly, East Africa) is a particularly dangerous place, i.e. a hotspot of terrorism, particularly the jihadist kind (2009:7). In 1989, the National Islamic Front (called the National Congress Party after 1999) seized power in Sudan, marking the ascent of militant Islamism as a powerful force in the Horn of Africa [which made Sudan] a new epicenter of the militant Islamic world, providing shelter to Islamist fighters (Kagwanja, 2006:75).

## **2.6 Counter Terrorism in the Horn of Africa**

According to Dempsey, the United States had been engaged in counter terrorism in Africa before September 11 by direct military action and examples include the bombing of Libya in 1986 by the Reagan administration in response to Libyan sponsored terrorist attacks against U.S. targets in Europe; the U.S. cruise missile attacks on targets in The Sudan and in Afghanistan in 1998 in response to the Al Qaeda bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Dempsey, 2006:19).

But the US effort became much more vigorous after the events of 9/11 and the declaration of America's Global War on Terror (GWOT) that involve the US forces in battle grounds like Afghanistan and Iraq. Shinn states that, the US has identified East Africa and the Horn as the priority region in Africa for counter-terrorism cooperation because of its past history of terrorist acts (Shinn, 2003:89).

Piombo sates that the US counter terrorism policy in Africa, in general, revolves around "the four D's" of fighting terrorism: defeat terrorists and their organizations; deny sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists; diminish the underlying conditions that terrorist seek to exploit, and defend US citizens and interests at Home and abroad (Piombo, 2007:5).

According to West, the United States established Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti outside of the capital city. CJTF-HOA is based in

Djibouti, in part because of its location on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the second busiest shipping line in the world and a potential conduit for terrorist activity (West, 2005:6).

It also has a training camp in Ethiopia, near Dire Dawa, for the purpose of training Ethiopian forces in countering terrorism. Since 2002, the United States has stationed between 1,200 to 1,800 troops (Lyman, 2008:3). It is responsible to fighting terrorism in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Yemen, and in the coastal waters of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean (Shinn, 2004:41). Initially US Central Command backs the CJTF-HOA to achieve its mission: detecting, disrupting, and defeating transnational terrorist groups; countering the resurgence of international terrorism; and enhancing long term stability of the region (Kagwanja, 2006: 82).

But, recently, CJTF-HOA came under the African Command (AFRICOM). CJTF-HOA is comprised of service members from each military branch of the U.S. Armed Forces (Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen), civilian employees, and representatives of coalition and partner nations [and] in addition to Civil Affairs missions (drilling wells, medical care, renovation of schools and clinics, etc.), CJTF-HOA also conducts military-to-military training, which includes counterterrorism training (globalsecurity.org).

Furthermore, scholars like Menkhaus criticize certain American counter terrorism strategies particularly in Somalia. He criticizes the US backing of Somali war lords in its fighting against terrorist cells namely al-Qaeda. The United States, since 2001, relied on local militia leaders to help monitor and apprehend suspects, has had only limited success, may be producing a public backlash, and now is on collision course with local state-building initiatives (Menkhaus cited in Rotberg, 2005:25).

The United States supported the alliance of warlords known as Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism (ARPCT) which was defeated by Islamic Courts Union which led to the Ethiopian invasion that further complicate regional conflicts that led Ethiopia and Eritrea's proxy war in Somalia. Eritrea's support for ICU leaders has incurred a warning that it will be designated a state sponsor of terrorism (Healy, 2008:39) which pushed Eritrea out from US counter terrorism plan. Mentioning the case of Morocco, especially the shantytowns of Casablanca where basic public service like housing, running, water, sewer, electricity,

etcare very much limited and where crime and drug trafficking are rampant, people applauded the 2003 suicide attack in Morocco.

## CHAPTER THREE METHODOLOGY

### 3.1 Description of the study area

This study focused on the area on Ethio – USA partnership on countering terrorism in the horn of Africa

### 3.2 research design

Research design implies the way a study is planned and conducted , the procedures and techniques employed to answer the research problems. It also shows how data will be gathered and whom to study .therefore in this study the researcher used qualitative research method .and also show how the research was conducted and how data gathered from respondent like profession on international relation studies and other persons from the department of political science and international relation.

### 3.3 research method

The study attempts to describe the cooperation of Ethio –USA in countering terrorism in the horn of Africa challenges and prospects by employing qualitative types of data.

In order to gather empirical information for the research , primary and secondary data were employed . while primary data was gathered from interview with experienced person on international relation also secondary data gathered from document analysis , like books, reports , legal documents and published and unpublished documents related to the research topic.

### 3.5 instrument of data collection

Data collection strategies were includes interview, document analysis like books,national reports ,interview and document analysis would obtain the deep and useful insight regarding the Ethio-USA relation on countering terrorism in the horn of Africa to this end the researcher has organized the data that helps to the finding part of the research.

### 3.6 data analysis

After the data for the study was gathered from responds through interview ,documentanalyss ,motivation was used for qualitative data analysis and descriptive method.

## Chapter Four Data Presentation and Analysis

### 4.1 Terrorism

According to the data obtained from official documents and interviews both Ethiopia and United States of America define terrorism objectively and they argue regardless of its purpose terrorism in its nature is the cause of destruction of human rights, peace and security, and of course human beings themselves. For them “one man’s terrorist is every one’s terrorist.

According to article 3 Ethiopian anti terrorism proclamation Proc. No. 652/2009 a terrorist is defined as follows

*“Whosoever or a group intending to advance a political, religious or ideological cause by coercing the government, intimidating the public or section of the public, or destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional or, economic or social institutions of the country:*

- 1. causes a person’s death or serious bodily injury;*
- 2. creates serious risk to the safety or health of the public or section of the public;*
- 3. commits kidnapping or hostage taking;*
- 4. causes serious damage to property;*
- 5. causes damage to natural resource, environment, historical or cultural heritages;*
- 6. endangers, seizes or puts under control, causes serious interference or disruption of any public service; or*
- 7. threatens to commit any of the acts stipulated under sub-articles (1) to (6) of this Article,”*

Thus the proclamation defines terrorism in broad ways and give due consideration for preventive approach. Similar to Ethiopia the United States of America, defines terrorism through the Department of State as follows

*“A premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”* (US Department of State, 2001).

According to the provision the US don’t consider a terrorist act perpetrated by a state i.e. state terrorism. The assumption behind these definitions is terrorist act committed by sub national groups as it is clearly stated in the definition by the United States. Finally for both states

terrorism is a serious crime against humanity and penalizes from 15 years prison to death penalties.

## **4.2 Terror Incidents and Government Responses**

### **4.2.1 Terrorist Incidents in Ethiopian and Government's Response**

#### **4.2.1.1 Terrorist incidents in Ethiopia**

The majority of Ethiopian's have good known how about terrorism. According to data obtained from the key informants from FDRE ministry defence, A Marxist-Leninist regime practiced governmental terrorism after it overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974. Ethiopian Airlines has a history of airplane hijackings. An Egyptian terrorist organization with the complicity of elements in Sudan tried to assassinate Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak as he arrived in Addis Ababa for an Organization of African Unity summit in 1995. This event hastened a downturn in ties with Sudan. Al Ittihad al Islamiya (AIAI), based in Somalia, and indigenous local groups including the Oromo Liberation Front, the militant wing of the Ogadeni National Liberation Front, and the now quiescent Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia have carried out kidnappings, assassination attempts, mining of roads, and bombings of bars, hotels, and public buildings.

But according to the data obtained from key informants of FDRE ministry of foreign affairs, Ethiopia appears to have remained free of terrorist attacks instigated by al Qaeda and other Middle East terrorist groups. Muslim Somalia and predominantly Muslim Sudan each have a 1,000-mile-long frontier with Ethiopia. There are few controls along the borders; persons can cross without detection. The export of Islamic radicalism from Sudan was a major concern of the Ethiopian government until the outbreak of conflict with Eritrea in 1998 changed the political dynamic in the region. In order to focus on its new Eritrean enemy, Ethiopia normalized its relations with Sudan. On the other hand, the situation with Somalia remains delicate. Ethiopia has significantly improved relations with Somaliland, the former Northern Province that declared its independence from Somalia in 1991. It remains at cross purposes, however, with the Transitional National Government and several other key groups in Somalia.

Most of the terrorism directed against Ethiopia has links to Islam. Traditionally thought of as a “Christian” country, at least 45 percent of Ethiopia’s 67 million people are Muslim. Ethiopia’s approximately 30 million Muslims tie it with Morocco for the eleventh most populous Muslim nation in the world. Looked at another way, Ethiopia has more Muslims than Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Virtually surrounded by Muslims, Ethiopia historically experienced several Islamic invasions. Recent relations between Muslims and Christians have been generally cordial. Ethiopian Muslims have not been receptive to Islamic radicalism and they lack centralized power.

They tend to identify first with their ethnic kin. Muslims and Christians are geographically intermixed throughout most of the country. Islam in Ethiopia has been benign during the past century. But the potential for conflict is present. A few hundred Ethiopian Muslims marched in Addis Ababa to demonstrate in support of Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War. Ethiopian security forces quickly dispersed them. After Ethiopia joined the coalition of the willing against Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, police prevented a Muslim demonstration in Addis Ababa. Representatives of the Muslim community expressed regret to a senior Foreign Ministry official that Ethiopia sided with the coalition. Although only one person’s opinion, a senior Ethiopian academic recently commented that Ethiopia’s religious equilibrium is collapsing and being replaced by a new militancy that is a threat to peace and stability.

#### **4.2.1.2 The Ethiopian Government Response**

According to data obtained from key informants at FDRE ministry of justice and defence Ethiopia has a tough, effective security apparatus that dates from the revolutionary opposition’s long conflict with the Derg regime. Many security service personnel are veterans of this military campaign. Their tactics are firm, some would say harsh, and they have developed an impressive intelligence capacity. Corruption seems to be minimal in the service. As a result, Ethiopia is not as soft a target as nearby countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. But its security service is far from infallible. The failed assassination attempt against President Mubarak was planned inside Ethiopia for at least a year; some of the plotters married Ethiopian women to improve their cover. Although Ethiopia did not uncover the plot, it did, with Egyptian help, prevent the assassins from harming Mubarak and subsequently tracked down and killed several of the perpetrators.

During the period that Ethiopia had poor relations with Sudan from 1995 until late 1998, it considered the export of Islamic radicalism from Sudan its greatest security threat. Sudan supported a variety of Ethiopian organizations that wanted to overthrow the government. Ethiopia played the same tit-for-tat game. It offered strong support, including military assistance, to the Sudan People's Liberation Movement whose goal was to replace the government in Khartoum. Ethiopia joined Eritrea and Uganda in an American-led "frontline states" policy against Sudan. The policy ended after Ethiopia normalized relations with Sudan. The major external threat, aside from the conflict with Eritrea, then became Somalia, which AIAI used as a base for terrorist attacks in Ethiopia. Ethiopia cracked down hard on AIAI across the Somali border and established alliances with several groups inside Somalia.

In view of Somalia's long-standing goal of incorporating Somalis residing in Ethiopia (and those in Kenya and Djibouti) into a "Greater Somalia," Ethiopia prefers a weak and divided Somalia, especially if a united Somalia results in an unfriendly neighbor. Ethiopia believes that AIAI is linked to al Qaeda and there is evidence to support this claim. Many Somalis, on the other hand, claim that AIAI is not a terrorist organization or, if it has engaged in violent acts against Ethiopia, argue that these acts do not qualify as terrorism. Addis Ababa has every right to retaliate against AIAI when it attacks Ethiopia, but it should not, they say, use this as an excuse to interfere in Somali internal affairs. Most Somalis are convinced that Ethiopia wants only to keep Somalia weak and divided. This breeds Somali hostility and increases the probability of new attacks against Ethiopia from Somalia.

## **4.2.2 Terrorist Incidents in USA and Government's Response**

### **4.2.2.1 Terrorist Incidents in USA**

On September 11, 2001, during the first year of this new millennium, the cities of New York and Washington D.C. were attacked by terrorists with radical Islamist ties. The loss of life approximately 3,000 Civilians was exceeded in American history only by battles during The Civil War, although cities in other countries had far greater civilian Casualties during World War II. October's truck attack in Manhattan was the latest major terrorist attack on US soil that has been carried out by those who have claimed inspiration from Islamist terror groups like al-Qaida or

Isis. It is the latest attack of its kind since the 11 September attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 that left nearly 3,000 people dead and prompted president George W Bush to launch military action against al-Qaida in Afghanistan. Here is a timeline of other major terror attacks in the US:

4 July 2002 Hesham Muhammad Hadayet, an Egyptian national with a green card giving him permanent status in the United States, killed two people and wounded four at an El Al ticket counter at Los Angeles International Airport. Hadayet also died. The FBI later concluded that it was an act of terrorism but that Hadayet was acting alone.

1 June 2009 In 2009, Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad, an American-born convert to Islam, opened fire on an army recruiting office in Little Rock, Arkansas. Muhammad killed one soldier and wounded another. Muhammad, who previously lived in Yemen, claimed to be a member of al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula. His lawyers produced an expert who testified that he was delusional and Muhammad eventually pled guilty to avoid the death penalty.

5 November 2009 Army major Nidal Hasan opened fire in the Soldier Readiness Processing Center at Fort Hood, Texas. The American-born Hasan killed 13 fellow soldiers and wounded 32. Hasan was also paralyzed in the attack. At his trial, he declared himself to be at war with America and investigators found that although he acted alone, he had accessed jihadist websites. Hasan was sentenced to death and is currently incarcerated in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

15 April 2013 The Boston Marathon bombing attack was carried out by two brothers, Dzhokhar and Tamerlan Tsarnaev. The bomb placed at the finish line of the Boston Marathon killed three people and injured 264. The two later killed Sean Collins, an MIT police officer. In addition, in a firefight between the brothers and the police, 16 officers were injured and another later died. Tamerlan, the older brother, died after he was shot by police and his brother ran over him in a car in an attempt to escape. Dzhokhar was apprehended and sentenced to death in federal court. The two Kyrgyz-American immigrants had been self-radicalized but learned to make their bomb from the al-Qaida online magazine Inspire.

16 July 2015 Muhammad Youssef Abdulazeez attacked both a marine recruiting office and US Navy reserve center. Abdulazeez first opened fire on the recruiting office from a car, wounding a recruiter inside. He then drove to a Navy reserve center where he killed four marines and one seaman before police officers killed him. Abdulazeez was an American citizen born in Kuwait. Former FBI director James Comey later said Abdulazeez was “motivated by foreign terrorist organization propaganda.”

15 December 2015 A married couple, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tasheen Malik, opened fire on a Christmas party at the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health, where Farook worked. Fourteen people died and 24 were injured. Farook was born in the United States and Malik was a Pakistani immigrant who married Farook in Saudi Arabia after they met on the internet. The two were later killed in a shootout with police. The FBI later described the two as “homegrown violent extremists” and found that they had radicalized before they met online.

12 June 2016 American-born Omar Mateen killed 49 people and wounded 58 at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida. In calls made during his rampage at the gay nightclub, Mateen pledged allegiance to Isis. After his initial assault, the attack into a hostage situation that lasted for nearly three hours. Eventually police stormed the nightclub and killed Mateen in a shootout. Barack Obama later said that Mateen was “inspired by various extremist information that was disseminated over the internet”.

31 October 2017 A man drove a rented pickup truck into cyclists and runners on the Hudson River bike path on Manhattan’s lower west side, killing eight people and injuring 11. Sayfullo Saipov, a 29-year-old immigrant from Uzbekistan, has been charged with murder. On 28 November 2017, he pleaded not guilty. The next hearing in Saipov’s case is set for 23 January.

#### **4.2.2.2 The US government Response to Terrorism**

The United States responded in several ways to the threat of terrorism in the Horn of Africa. These are overt and covert or secret responses. In countering terrorism, the United States, in addition to democratization as a long term strategy for countering terrorism, laid out four Priorities in its National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT) which was revealed in 2003 and later upgraded in 2006. These priorities are:

1. Prevent terrorist attacks by attacking terrorists and their capacity to operate and travel, and by defending potential targets;
2. Deny weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to rogue states and terrorist allies
3. Deny terrorists the support and sanctuary of rogue states; and
4. Deny terrorist's physical, legal, Cyber and financial safe havens.

The National Security Strategy by the Obama Administration states that: The United States is waging a global campaign against al-Qa'ida and its terrorist affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, we are pursuing a strategy that protects our homeland, secures the world's most dangerous weapons and material, denies al-Qa'ida safe haven, and builds positive partnerships with Muslim communities around the world. Success requires a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of American power—both military and civilian—as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions (2010:19).

This clearly shows that the current Administration's counter terrorism policy emphasizes counter radicalization efforts, an area in which officials suggest US efforts have lacked sufficient focus [i.e.] specific political, economic, and social factors that may radicalize individuals in a particular community' (Ploch, 2010:14). These are what the USAID calls —Drivers of Violent Extremism in its study entitled Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism.

The USAID guide refers to addressing the root causes of violent extremism i.e. Socioeconomic Drivers and Political Drivers. Socioeconomic Drivers can be reasons for people to resort to

violent extremism because of the public's interpretation of total abandonment from basic public services by the state and the ruling elite. Mentioning the case of Morocco, especially the shantytowns of Casablanca where basic public service like housing, running, water, sewer, electricity, etc. are very much limited and where crime and drug trafficking are rampant, people applauded the 2003 suicide attack in Morocco.

As mentioned earlier, these kinds of marginalization can be found in the Horn of Africa in abundance. For instance, in countries like Kenya many Muslims express a sense of social, cultural, political, [and] economic exclusion from the rest of the country [where] social service delivery and infrastructure investments have been historically poor in these areas, in comparison with other parts of the country' (Ploch, 2010:16). In these Muslim populated areas of northeastern Kenya, Islamic charities used to play very important role until some of them were banned after 1998 embassy bombings and September 11.

The USAID Guide also identifies different Political Drivers of violent extremism. It lists down seven important factors:

- A. Denial of basic political rights (—political exclusion) and civil liberties.
- B. Highly repressive regimes that engage in gross violations of human rights.
- C. Endemic corruption and impunity for well-connected elites.
- D. The presence of safe havens, poorly-governed or ungoverned areas.
- E. Pre-existing, protracted and violent local conflicts that can be exploited by violent extremist organizations seeking to advance their own agendas.
- F. State sponsorship of [violent extremist] groups.
- G. Discredited regimes with weak or non-existent opposition (2009:27).

These Political Drivers cannot be separated from one another. Harsh government repression and Systemic political exclusion usually go hand in hand [and] resentment at pervasive impunity for Well-connected elites may compound rage created by gross violation of human

rights' (Deneoux& Carter, 2009:27). Sometimes these Political Drivers can be connected to Socioeconomic Drivers in such a way that \_corruption may sap state capacity by undermining the government's ability to confront the social exclusion which often fuels [violent extremism]' (Deneoux& Carter, 2009:27). The Horn of Africa experienced all these Political Drivers. Political exclusions, repressive governments, corruption (especially in Kenya), porous borders, violent local conflicts both inter state (Eritrea and Ethiopia) and intra state (Sudan and Somalia), state sponsorship of Violent extremists (allegedly in Sudan), discredited regimes with no or weak opposition are all Present in the Horn. The United States is trying to mitigate violent extremism using different counter extremism Programs in East Africa. According to Ploch, these counter extremism programs include influence operations/public diplomacy, financial sanctions and travel restrictions, assistance to counter terrorist financing, constraining terrorist mobility, and building regional partners' counter terrorism capabilities.

The public diplomacy component of these programs deals with changing the \_attitude and perception of foreign population'so that they become supportive of US policies and interests. In East Africa, it implements things like using State Department's website which is available in seven languages about the US policies and American societies, organize a Multicultural Ramadan' with American Muslims, opening American Corners in cities like Mombassa, outreach efforts like American Reference Center in Nairobi, deploying members of

*For detailed discussion on these programs see Lauren Ploch, 2010, Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response', pp 17-22*

US Special Operations Command Military Information Support Teams (MIST) with special training in understanding the region into countries like Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, and broadcasting Voice of America (VOA) in seven languages. The financial sanctions and travel restrictions component refers to implementing Executive Order E.O.) 13224 which orders prosecution and freezing of assets of terrorist organizations and of those financing terrorist organizations led by Department of Treasury and Office of Foreign assets Control (OFAC) in consultation with other governmental institutions like the State Department.

The United States also implements other means of counter terrorism measures that some of them are very much criticized. As it was mentioned above, the US concern is very much on Somalia regarding al-Qaeda's presence in the Horn of Africa. The US employed different mechanisms in

order to prevent the ascendancy of Islamist forces in Somalia which might culminate in being a safe haven and being the sanctuary of terrorist cells particularly al-Qaeda. Menkhaus argues in 2005 that ‘American counter terrorism policy since 2001, which has relied on local militia leaders to help monitor and apprehend suspects, has had only limited success, may be producing a public backlash, and now is on collision course with local state-building initiatives’ (in Rotberg, 2005:25).

By mid-2000s the power of Islamic forces grew particularly the influence of Sharia courts especially in Mogadishu and the feud over the control of Mogadishu with warlords exacerbated. ‘The US became increasingly concerned with the growing power of the Islamic Courts and in February 2006 aided the creation of the Alliance for Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT), a coalition of Mogadishu warlords opposed to the courts’ (Shinn, 2008:22) .

Craig Timberg, reporting from Mogadishu for Washington Post, described the situation as: ‘the warlords, feared and hated by many Somalis, bragged about the money [they received from US] as they armed themselves as never before [where] the infusion of cash upset a fragile balance between the two sides-but not in the direction the Americans had hoped’.

Even though the aim of United States in establishing this Alliance is for very much narrow purpose of apprehending al-Qaeda operatives in Somalia, ‘the new organization of warlords used the ARPCT, however, to wage war on the courts [, and eventually,] the warlords had lost the support of most Somalis who just wanted an end to conflict where ARPCT military effort fared badly and by June 2006 the Islamic Courts [Union] had defeated the ARPCT decisively’ (Shinn, 2008:22). This led to another much criticized US counter terrorism strategy of giving support for the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in the same year.

After the Islamic Courts Union took control of the Somali capital Mogadishu, they began to control more territories and eventually reached the town of Baidoa, where the internationally recognized and US/Ethiopia-backed ineffectual Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was located.

The spread of the ICU, whose more radical elements had declared jihad on Ethiopia, prompted Ethiopia to invade Somalia in December 2006 and drive the ICU from power' (Harnisch, 2010:11). There is a claim by Abdirahman Ali that the declaration of jihad by ICU forces was a deliberate move to provoke Ethiopia into invading Somalia so that 'it can over stretch the enemy's military resources, expose its weakness, harness the popular anger that results from the invasion, and in the end create a brutal savagery that will force people to yearn for someone to manage it' (2010:10).

The Ethiopian forces installed TFG in the capital Mogadishu which weakens the credibility of the government because of its dependency on Ethiopia for its survival. 'Shabaab easily exploited public anger at the TFG, conflating its radical jihadist ideology with Somali nationalism, antiEthiopian and anti-Western sentiment [and] the two year Ethiopian military occupation which some believed would cleanse Somalia of Islamic radicals did much to radicalize a much broader portion of the Somali population and legitimize Shabaab' (Menkhaus, 2010:3).

See the article by Craig Timberg, 'Mistaken Entry into Clan Dispute Led to U.S. Black Eye in Somalia',

Washington Post Foreign Service, July 2, 2006

The Ethiopian invasion created anger among Somalis living in Somalia and living abroad. 'US policies during and after the Ethiopian offensive were seen as silent on the extraordinary human costs, and Somalis took the silence to imply consent' (Menkhaus, 2009:4). This created the ideal situation for al-Shabaab and it presented itself the only viable resistance to the Ethiopian occupation. '[Al-] Shabaab was able to conflate its jihadist rhetoric with Somali nationalism and anti-Ethiopianism to win both passive and active support from many Somalis, including those who were personally appalled at the movement's extremist interpretation of Islam or its assassination of civic leaders' (Menkhaus, 2009:4).The United States took the opportunity of the Ethiopian invasion by conducting military strikes inside Somalia particularly in 2007 amid international criticism.

But Washington has dismissed the international criticism, saying it was necessary to defend the US and the international community from further al-Qaeda attacks [and] Somali officials say

leading al-Qaeda suspect, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, accused of masterminding the bomb attacks on US embassies in East Africa nine years ago, may be among those killed in the earlier raids' (BBC News, January 10, 2007).

The problem of Somalia is very much intertwined with regional conflicts and tensions in which the Horn of Africa is described as a 'security complex'. Ethiopia and Eritrea are both engaged in a proxy war in Somalia where Ethiopia has been supporting the TFG directly while Eritrea supports ICU and al-Shabaab. But Ethiopia is said to be playing an indirect role since its withdrawal from Somalia. Human Rights Watch claims that 'Addis Ababa continues to regard Somalia as source of insecurity, not least because it fears al-Shabaab and other groups could try to expand their reach to Ethiopia's own troubled Somali region [and] as of early 2010 Ethiopia was reportedly providing training to AhluSunnaWaljamaca' (2010:61) in order to balance the advance of al-Shabaab or Hizbul Islam into central Somalia. Eritrea's engagement in Somalia can be understood only in terms of Asmara's broader regional policies, most importantly its continuing dispute with Ethiopia.

### **4.3 The US Counter Terrorism Programs in the Horn of Africa**

The U.S. strategy for fighting terrorism is both shifting and vague, but five elements stand out:

- First, the U.S. seeks to destroy and disrupt al-Qa'ida and its affiliates, Commonly through the use of intelligence and law enforcement services.
- Second, the U.S. opposes states that sponsor terrorists or offer them sanctuary. Uncooperative regimes, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, will be coerced, or if necessary toppled.
- Third, there is a particular effort to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.
- Fourth, the U.S. has begun a relatively weak but by historical standards significant effort to promote democracy in the Middle East.
- Finally, much of counterterrorism policy is now bound up in Iraq.

The Bush administration has scored several important successes, particularly in the toppling of the Taliban and the global intelligence and law enforcement effort against al-Qa'ida and its

affiliates. The U.S. should expand cooperation with allied security services and improve its defenses to contain the terrorists while using military force to bolster these measures.

In the long-term, the terrorists' own weaknesses will come to the fore—something we can encourage by working to delegitimize them as well. Within this overarching framework, the U.S. should look at six “fronts” that are vital to success.

### **1. Intelligence**

It is a cliché that intelligence is at the core of successful counterterrorism but, like many clichés, it needs nuance when applied in practice.

- The brouhaha over the lack of U.S. assets (e.g. a spy in Bin Ladin's inner circle) has created unrealistic expectations about what intelligence can accomplish against terrorist groups.
- Most valuable intelligence assets will be controlled by liaison partners in the Muslim world. U.S. operations that risk this cooperation should be avoided.
- The priority for U.S. intelligence should be coordinating allied activity and ensuring that the information they provide us is complete and accurate.
- The Bush administration's prioritization of the nexus between counterterrorism and WMD should be continued. Pakistan should be given particular scrutiny.

### **2. Military**

A primary military role is to prevent the emergence of another Taliban-type sponsor, particularly one such as Pakistan that has access to nuclear weapons or Saudi Arabia which controls a critical resource and has considerable wealth. Targeted killings are also an appropriate use of military force, though they should be used sparingly. Training allies for counterinsurgency is also vital given the role insurgencies play in the global *jihadist* movement. Limited military strikes usually fail and often backfire. Attacks in 1986 on Libya and in 1998 on Afghanistan worsened terrorism.

### **3. Diplomacy**

Allies are vital for counterterrorism, but what we ask of them is quite different from what was asked of traditional alliance partners during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath. For purposes of the war on terrorism, the most important new partners are India, Indonesia, and Pakistan.

Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen also are newly important. Britain, Canada, Egypt, France, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey remain important allies, while China, Japan, and South Korea all matter less than before when the U.S. focus is on al-Qa'ida and its affiliates.

- Much of this cooperation will not have the degree of institutionalization that characterized alliances like NATO during the Cold War.
- Efforts to strengthen local regimes' counterterrorism capacities may inhibit democratic reform.
- U.S. cooperation with allies involved in their own struggles with Islamist groups will incur the opprobrium associated with their unpopular measures, such as Israel's activities in Palestine and Russia's repression in Chechnya.

#### **4. Homeland Defense**

U.S. homeland defense is poorly coordinated internally and not well integrated into the rest of the national security bureaucracy. Much of the spending is merely pork-barrel politics masquerading as security.

- A first step is to develop broad agreement on which targets will be protected and the methodology for evaluating tradeoffs. Right now, the U.S. does not focus carefully on targeting from a *jihadist* perspective.
- A homeland information strategy is vital. Far more economic (and perhaps human) damage may be done in the reaction to an attack than the attack itself.

#### **5. Democratic Reform**

Democratic reform has some benefits for counterterrorism, but it can weaken regimes while simultaneously empowering anti-U.S. forces.

- For now, the U.S. should build institutions and strengthen pro-U.S. voices.
- If a country is undergoing a democratic transformation (e.g. Indonesia), the U.S. should strive to support it, as the risks of failure can be considerable.

## 6. War of Ideas

The U.S. effort to win over Muslim (particularly Arab) hearts and minds has failed singularly.

- Rather than trying to build up America's image, we should undertake the easier and more productive task of tearing down the *jihadists*.
- The U.S. should emphasize local themes and give more control to country teams in Embassies: what works in Morocco may not work in Indonesia.

## 7. Iraq

The Bush administration argues that the U.S. presence in Iraq diverts terrorists from attacking the U.S. homeland, that success in Iraq would foster good governance that would decrease terrorism in general, and that al-Qa'ida affiliates would control Iraq if the U.S. departed. All these Arguments are at best overstated and at worse flat wrong. In reality, Iraq is a no-win situation for the broader struggle against terrorism. Each day the U.S. stays in Iraq is a boon for al-Qa'ida and the broader *jihadist* movement. A U.S. withdrawal that left Iraq in chaos, however, would also be a boon for al-Qa'ida: it would allow the *jihadists* to claim a great victory and, more importantly, risks recreating a large haven for the movement and allows them to strike Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and other states in the region. The most feasible approach that would entail realistic and tolerable sacrifices for the U.S. may be a limited drawdown, with the U.S. retaining a small conventional force presence (much of which could be deployed outside Iraq) and a significant covert and training capability.

- Much of this presence would be focused on containing the *jihadists* in Iraq.
- The U.S. must also hedge against the possibility that unrest will spread beyond Iraq.

Recent US policy toward Somalia has generally been counterproductive and the result of false or exaggerated sources of information. This has strengthened the cause of Islamist groups. However, not all US policy has had a negative impact. During the famine and humanitarian crisis that followed the attack on Mogadishu in 1992, the US supported major food assistance to Somalia from Kenya. However, since this period, the focus of US policy toward Somalia has rarely been humanitarian aid.

Somalia piqued the interest of US intelligence in 1998 after the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. The bombings were linked to Osama bin Ladin and al-Qaeda and the US

suspected that al-Qaeda was based in Somalia and was linked to AIAI. The real change in the US's approach to Somalia came in 2001 with the initiation of the War on Terror as a reaction to the attacks on the World Trade Center. Renewed US interest in Somalia resulted from a mistaken belief that following the US invasion of Afghanistan, the Taliban would move to Somalia. When this did not happen, non-military interest in Somalia subsided and from 2001 to 2008 Somalia was on the US's radar mainly as a potential haven for terrorists and not as a country in need of humanitarian aid.

Beyond not supplying aid, the US's military focus on Somalia had a further negative impact. After the World Trade Center attacks, the US relied on Ethiopian reports on links between Somalia's Islamist groups and al-Qaeda, which were exaggerated to reflect Ethiopia's political interests. For instance, while there were demonstrable links between Somali Islamist groups and al-Qaeda, which used Somalia as a place of sojourn and transit, there were no al-Qaeda bases in Somalia. Hypersensitive to potential terrorist attacks, the US nevertheless planned for military intervention in Somalia. It eventually refrained from deploying ground troops and instead tried to isolate Somalia internationally. The Somali passport effectively became obsolete. International travel remained possible only to the few Somalis with foreign passports. Financial institutions and aid groups found their services disrupted. The US also put pressure on Arab organizations in the country. As a consequence, humanitarian groups such as the Saudi Arabian al-Haramayn closed orphanages and left the country.

After September 11th, the US specifically targeted financial institutions in both Somalia and Afghanistan through Operation Green Quest. It is not entirely clear why the US was targeting financial institutions in failed states, which could have been a safe haven for terrorist cells, as opposed to targeting financial institutions in the Gulf states, which had a long and demonstrable history of financing terrorist organizations. In the long run, this may have been a counterproductive activity, especially in Somalia. Within Somalia US operations targeted money transfer agencies known as sharikathawwalat. The US claimed that there was a clear link between these agencies and al-Qaeda, only to retract this statement five months later. These money transfer agencies are an integral part of the Somali economy—remittances make up about 70 percent of GDP and by disrupting their ability to function, the US negatively impacted the

daily lives of Somalis. These actions benefitted Islamist groups, as public opinion turned against the US.

More recently, the 2006 war between Mogadishu's Islamists and the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism (ARPC) was at least partially caused by US anti-terrorist intervention in Mogadishu, and has put Somalia on a worrisome political trajectory. Worried that the state of lawlessness in Somalia would lead to its use as safe haven for international terrorist organizations, the US developed relationships with local warlords and businessmen in Mogadishu, in an attempt to monitor the situation and create an anti-terrorism network. These relations rarely succeeded in providing useful information as the neighborhoods that the US believed were housing terrorists could not be infiltrated. To make matters worse, many of these US emissaries were rivals, whose personal militias would often clash. However, the US pushed them to work together and in February 2006 a group formed the ARPC. Islamists in Mogadishu, including AIAI, viewed this as a direct attack. Armed clashes began within weeks between the two groups, the outcome of which was the formation of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC). By June 2007 the Islamists had clearly won and taken control of the entire capital. This was the first time Mogadishu had been under unified rule in 16 years.

This situation presents a policy challenge for the United States, which correctly sees Ethiopia as a reliable partner for combating terrorism and one with which it should cooperate on security matters. This includes the sharing of intelligence, training of Ethiopian security personnel, and cooperation in counter-terrorism programs. At the same time, the United States should engage only in activities that clearly meet American objectives and avoid those that may have unintended negative consequences for the region, especially in Somalia.

American policy should emphasize the shutting down of al Qaeda operatives and supporters in Ethiopia and the region. If it can be shown clearly that AIAI is working on behalf of al Qaeda, the same policy should apply. Indigenous organizations like the Oromo Liberation Front and the militant wing of the Ogaden National Liberation Front that sometimes use terrorist tactics pose a greater dilemma. These groups are not included on the American Terrorist Exclusion List and have legitimate grievances.

#### **4.4. The US-Ethiopia Counter Terrorism Strategies in the Horn of Africa**

According to Bronwyn Bruton says the U.S.-Ethiopia security partnership is undermining U.S. counterterror goals in Somalia. If the United States hopes to play a constructive role in Somalia, it must address democracy backsliding in Ethiopia, she says. U.S. strategic interests in the Horn of Africa center on preventing Somalia from becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda or other transnational jihadist groups. In pursuing its counterterror strategy, the United States has found common cause with Ethiopia. The Ethiopian government has long feared the renewal of Somali irredentist claims on its eastern border, or that a powerful Islamist movement may stoke unrest among its own large Muslim population, and feels beset both by a powerful indigenous separatist movement in its Ogaden region and an unresolved border dispute with its northern neighbor, Eritrea.

But the Ethiopian government's behavior in recent years, both domestically and in bordering states, poses mounting difficulties for the United States and its long-term goals in the region. Washington must be prepared to press its partner to alter its strong-handed approach to political dissent and counterterrorism or consider ending the relationship.

Ethiopia has struggled with internal reforms since the collapse of the communist Derg regime in 1991. The country's economy has grown, but attempts to institutionalize a system of multiparty democracy have stumbled.

In 2005, Ethiopia held largely free and fair democratic elections. Prior to the polls, there was an unprecedented opening of political space. Opposition political parties were able to hold rallies, the press was able to publish critical political analysis, and international and local civil society organizations assisted in election monitoring. But the government's tentative efforts to increase political space were not rewarded: After a series of irregularities in the vote closing and tallying processes were discovered, a variety of political parties contested the election results. The Ethiopian government declared a state of emergency and responded brutally to a series of apparently peaceful protests. The country was plunged into a period of violent civil disturbance, during which the Ethiopian government detained thousands of protestors and arrested hundreds of opposition figures, including arguably nonpolitical actors from civil society and the press.

Many of these emergency measures have been institutionalized, resulting in legislation that has criminalized social advocacy by "foreigners" (including Ethiopian civil society organizations that receive foreign charitable funds), and imposed harsh criminal penalties on broadly defined "terrorist" acts, including disruptive public protests.

Change is needed to ensure the sustainability of the U.S.-Ethiopia partnership and U.S. counterterrorism goals in the region at a time when Somalia continues to flounder as a failed state. The United States should consider adopting a more assertive approach that makes use of two primary points of leverage:

First, the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) should refuse direct funding to the many known "GONGOS" (governmental nongovernmental organizations) that pose as legitimate civil society development organizations, but are in practice political and social agents of the ruling party. The recognition of GONGOs as legitimate civil society organizations abets the Ethiopian strategy of marginalizing nongovernmental actors, and allows the government to continue a "business as usual" approach to the delivery of international support.

Ethiopian certainty that U.S. aid is inviolate has allowed the Ethiopian government to effectively tune out demands for reform. Ethiopian dependence on U.S. assistance is a card that policymakers must learn to play to provoke meaningful change.

Second, the United States should publicly express its concern over the shrinking democratic space, the crisis in the Ogaden, and Ethiopia's refusal to uphold the findings of the independent border commission. Ethiopian officials are extremely sensitive to public opinion and likely to respond to threats to their country's international standing and participation in international fora such as the African Union and the United Nations.

Relations with Ethiopia are likely to become strained, and the United States can expect, at least initially, to receive very limited support from its European partner nations. These countries, including France, Germany and the United Kingdom, lack the political leverage necessary to lead a collective shift in donor policy and have been hesitant to alienate the Ethiopian government. This reluctance may require a diplomatic version of the "good cop/bad cop"

approach, in which the United States agrees to take an isolated, leadership role in demanding change, while European donor nations persist in a strategy of quiet diplomacy. This has the advantage of ensuring that some constructive dialogue will continue.

In a worst-case scenario, the United States may have to threaten to suspend foreign and military aid to Ethiopia. U.S. humanitarian and development assistance to Ethiopia was upwards of \$650 million in 2008, and the U.S. has contributed significant, though less transparent, financial and tactical support to Ethiopia's attempts to modernize its armed forces. Such an action has rightly been perceived as unthinkable in the past, as the cessation of aid would certainly risk destabilizing the Ethiopian government and may precipitate widespread public disorder. At the same time, Ethiopian certainty that U.S. aid is inviolate has allowed the Ethiopian government to effectively tune out demands for reform. Ethiopian dependence on U.S. assistance is a card that policymakers must learn to play to provoke meaningful change. This is another reason to consider developing a good cop/bad cop arrangement with the European donors--if the United States is forced to suspend aid, other donors may mitigate the shortfall while quietly reinforcing demands for democratic reform.

The prospect of strained relations with Ethiopia at a time of regional crisis is not desirable. If the United States ultimately wishes to sustain its partnership with Ethiopia, however, inaction is the more dangerous option. Democratic space in Ethiopia will continue to erode, while human rights abuses in the Ogaden and ongoing Ethiopian military incursions in Somalia will continue to stoke anti-American sentiment in the Horn. U.S. efforts to mitigate the conflict in Somalia, and to support Somalia's struggling Transitional Federal Government (TFG), will be fatally undermined by this dynamic. The visible reentry of Ethiopian troops into Somalia already threatens to extinguish the last embers of popular support for the TFG, and may rekindle the insurgency dynamic that brought the Shabaab to power throughout southern Somalia. At the same time, Ethiopian and Eritrean intransigence over the border dispute will ensure a continued flow of arms into the hands of various Somali factions.

The United States has recently taken positive steps to disaggregate its Somalia policy from that of Ethiopia. These steps include diplomatic outreach to Eritrea and public attempts to restrain Ethiopian military action in response to the escalating violence in Mogadishu. These constructive

efforts need to be coupled with more assertive diplomacy in Addis Ababa. Until Ethiopia becomes a credible democracy, the U.S.-Ethiopia partnership will do more harm to U.S. regional standing than good.

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#### **4.5 The Prospects of the US –Ethiopia Counter Terrorism Strategies in Horn of Africa**

The Greater Horn of Africa -- a region half the size of the United States that includes Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda -- is the hottest conflict zone in the world. Some of the most violent wars of the last half century have ripped the region apart. Today, two clusters of conflicts continue to destabilize it. The first centers on interlocking rebellions in Sudan, including those in Darfur and southern Sudan, and engulfs northern Uganda, eastern Chad, and northeastern Central African Republic. The main culprit is the Sudanese government, which is supporting rebels in these three neighboring countries -- and those states, which are supporting Sudanese groups opposing Khartoum. The second cluster links the festering dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea with the power struggle in Somalia, which involves the fledgling secular government, antigovernment clan militias, Islamist militants, and anti-Islamist warlords. Ethiopia's flash intervention in Somalia in December temporarily secured the ineffectual transitional government's position, but that intervention, which Washington backed and supplemented with its own air strikes, has sown the seeds for an Islamist and clan-based insurgency in the future.

Recent U.S. policy has only made matters worse. The region, which has both suffered attacks by al Qaeda and hosted its agents (including Osama bin Laden himself), is a legitimate concern of U.S. officials. But stemming the spread of terrorism and extremist ideologies has become such an overwhelming strategic objective for Washington that it has overshadowed U.S. efforts to resolve conflicts and promote good governance; in everything but rhetoric, counterterrorism now consumes U.S. policy in the Greater Horn as totally as anticommunism did a generation ago. To support this critical but narrow aim, the Bush administration has too often nurtured relationships with autocratic leaders and favored covert and military action over diplomacy. Sometimes that

has even included feting in Langley Sudanese officials suspected of having a hand in the massacres in Darfur or handing suitcases full of cash to warlords on the streets of Mogadishu.

The results have been disastrous. Sudan's autocrats are reverting to the extremism of their roots. In Somalia, the core of the Islamist militant movement remains intact after Ethiopia's invasion, its members' passions inflamed by the intervention. The leaders of Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda have used the specter of war and the imperative of counterterrorism as excuses to crack down on political opponents and restive populations at home. The humanitarian situation throughout the region, fragile even in times of peace, is now catastrophic: nearly nine million people have been displaced, and chronic insecurity severely constrains access to humanitarian aid for the more than 16 million people who need it.

The fundamental flaw in Washington's approach is its lack of a regional diplomatic strategy to tackle the underlying causes of the two clusters of conflicts. These crises can no longer be addressed in isolation, with discrete and uncoordinated ad hoc peace initiatives. Washington must work to stabilize the Greater Horn through effective partnerships with Africa's multilateral institutions, the European Union, and the new UN secretary-general. Until it does, long-term U.S. counterterrorism objectives will suffer -- and the region will continue to burn.

## DEATH ON THE NILE

Since gaining its independence in 1956, Sudan, the largest country in the region, has been engulfed in a series of civil wars pitting Arab-dominated governments in Khartoum against rebels from marginalized groups. In the face of continued unrest, the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), which took charge in a coup in 1989, has armed and trained ethnic-based militias in Sudan and throughout the region and granted them impunity for mass atrocities against civilians it suspects of supporting its opponents.

In the south, the 21-year civil war between Khartoum and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) killed 2.2 million people -- making it the second-deadliest conflict in the world since World War II, after the civil war in Congo, which killed 3.8 million people. The NCP enlisted the Lord's Resistance Army, a millenarian rebel group based in northern Uganda, to open a second front against the SPLA. Khartoum also backed it to punish the Ugandan government for

supporting the SPLA. The result there has been 1.7 million people in displaced camps and, courtesy of the Lord's Resistance Army, the highest rate of child abductions in the world.

The war in southern Sudan officially ended in January 2005 with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The deal granted autonomy to the area and gave the SPLA majority control of the new Government of Southern Sudan, based in Juba, and a minority role in the Government of National Unity, in Khartoum. It also provided for a referendum in 2011, in which the people of southern Sudan will decide whether to secede from the rest of the country. But two years later, the situation is not encouraging. The implementation of critical components of the arrangement -- notably the demobilization of the NCP's proxy militias in southern Sudan, the demarcation of borders in oil-producing areas, and the transparent disbursement of oil revenues -- is lagging. War clouds have been forming again since John Garang, the SPLA's charismatic leader and a leading proponent of a unified Sudan, died in a helicopter crash in July 2005. Without him, the SPLA has failed to assert itself in the Government of National Unity.

Another problem is that the negotiations leading to the agreement did not involve opposition groups from Darfur and other northern areas. That left opponents of the government in Darfur feeling that they had no other recourse but to attack military outposts, police stations, and other government interests to win a place at the negotiating table. Since the rebellion broke out there in February 2003, the NCP has supported Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, who routinely attack the non-Arab civilians backing the rebels. Some 200,000 to 450,000 Darfurians are estimated to have died since April 2003, 2.5 million have been driven from their homes, and two-thirds of all Darfurians -- some 4.3 million people -- now need humanitarian assistance of some kind. Partly thanks to U.S. efforts, the Darfur Peace Agreement was signed in May 2006, but the negotiators secured signatures from leaders of only one rebel faction, which alienated other groups and soon resulted in more fighting. The conflict has since spilled over into Chad and the Central African Republic -- causing another two million people in those countries to require humanitarian assistance. Khartoum has been supporting an array of rebel groups and militias in both countries in the hope of overthrowing their governments and installing friendlier regimes.

In eastern Sudan, too, rebels took up arms against the regime, more than a decade ago. Although the Eritrean government mediated an agreement between the NCP and rebels there in October 2006, the deal has yet to face a serious test. In the meantime, the regime in Khartoum continues to respond ferociously to all uprisings -- a sign that it is desperate to maintain power by any means and hold on to its growing oil wealth.

## ALL TANGLED UP

The second cluster of conflicts centers on Somalia and also involves Ethiopia, Eritrea, and northeastern Kenya. Somalia, the only country in the world without an operational government, has been headless since 1991, when the country's leader -- and a U.S. ally -- Muhammad SiadBarre, was overthrown. Warlords held sway in urban centers for over a decade after that, despite no fewer than 14 initiatives to create a central government. Finally, in 2004, under the impetus of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a regional organization, a fragile body known as the Transitional Federal Government was set up, headquartered first in Kenya and then, in mid-2005, in the Somali town of Baidoa. In the meantime, however, Somali Islamists had established in and around the capital, Mogadishu, 11 clan-based Islamic courts backed by militias, a few of which had close links to jihadists and terrorists suspected of being associated with al Qaeda.

The struggle for domination started coming to a head in mid-2006, when the Islamic courts defeated the warlords in Mogadishu and expanded their control over much of south-central Somalia. The courts managed to win over the population -- which is Muslim but of a Sufi persuasion averse to the courts' radical Salafism -- by providing security and basic services, which both the ineffectual transitional government and the predatory warlords had failed to assure. The Ethiopian government, having grown increasingly concerned about the Islamists' rising influence, sent troops across the border at the end of 2006. The fighting was over before it began. The Islamists melted into the civilian population, leaving a few militia groups to be pursued by Ethiopian forces.

The Ethiopian government had a number of reasons for taking out the Islamic courts. Ethiopia and Somalia have had a tense history, including three wars between 1960 and 1978. Somalia has

hosted al-Itihaad al-Islamiya, a terrorist organization that planted several bombs in Ethiopia in the 1990s, prompting the Ethiopian government twice during that period to send troops into Somalia to destroy the group and dismantle its training camps. Last year, senior court officials made clear that they intended to incorporate Somali populations in the Somali region of southeastern Ethiopia into a greater Somalia. They were already backing Ethiopian opposition groups such as the Ogaden National Liberation Front and, in southern Oromia, the Oromo Liberation Front. This support was a direct challenge to Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, who, after a decade and a half of rule, faces internal political pressure from ethnic groups that feel underrepresented. Legislative elections in Ethiopia in 2005 were characterized by unprecedented openness, but after a strong showing by opposition parties, Meles' government cracked down.

These domestic troubles have also made it harder for Meles to budge on Ethiopia's border dispute with Eritrea -- another threat to regional stability. In the early 1990s, when Eritrea won its independence from Ethiopia after three decades of fighting, Ethiopia became a landlocked state. The two states' leaders, Meles and Isaias Afwerki, had good relations at first, but they soon fell out over economic and political matters, particularly the countries' ill-defined border. The tensions spiraled into an especially savage war in the late 1990s. In 2000, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a peace deal and agreed to submit their border dispute to "final and binding" resolution by an independent international commission. The ruling, issued in 2002, awarded the disputed town of Badme to Eritrea. Meles has steadfastly refused to implement it, however, arguing that the commission's methodology was flawed. He also objects because he is sensitive to the widespread sentiment among Ethiopians that he is responsible for losing the country's access to the Red Sea at Eritrea's independence; he is careful not to appear soft on Eritrea.

The Eritrean government, for its part, is increasingly frustrated by the international community's unwillingness to pressure Ethiopia to demarcate the border. In protest, President Isaias has restricted the UN peacekeeping force charged with observing the cease-fire and expelled international aid organizations. Continually invoking the prospect of imminent war, his government has clamped down on all opposition while needling Ethiopia by supporting the Ogaden National Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front. Ethiopia, meanwhile, backs

the Eritrean Democratic Alliance, an umbrella organization of groups opposed to the Eritrean government.

Even more worrisome for regional stability is the fact that Ethiopia and Eritrea are playing out their differences through their neighbors. While the Ethiopian government supports the Sudanese government, the Eritrean government -- which accused Khartoum of wanting to expand its Islamist reach throughout the region and of backing a rebellion by the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement in the 1990s -- maintains close relations with rebels in Darfur and eastern Sudan. At the same time, it has been providing weapons and forces to the Islamic courts in Somalia, principally in opposition to the Ethiopian government, which backs the transitional government there. The Sudanese government is also involved in Somalia's affairs. Using its temporary leadership of the Arab League, for example, it convened in Khartoum a meeting between representatives of the Somali transitional government and representatives of the Islamic courts in March 2006 -- a move that raised concerns among officials of the transitional government who are wary of ties between leaders of the Islamic courts, universities in Sudan, and Islamists in the NCP.

## BACKDRAFT

These proliferating threats could have been mitigated by smart U.S. policy, but Washington's approach to the Greater Horn of Africa, which centers on counterterrorism, has been erratic and shortsighted. The United States' overweening focus on stemming terrorism began early in the Clinton presidency in response to Khartoum's aggressive promotion of its ties to international terrorist organizations. Al Qaeda operatives based in Somalia blew up the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and, Washington suspects, attacked a hotel and an El Al plane in Kenya in 2002. Following the attacks of 9/11, Washington expanded its counterterrorism efforts in the region. It has deployed over 1,500 troops in Djibouti to carry out civil-affairs programs and help gather intelligence on suspected terrorists and has earmarked \$100 million a year to support counterterrorism efforts by local authorities. More than anything, however, the United States' counterterrorism policy in the Greater Horn of Africa now hinges on three strategies: almost unconditional support for the Ethiopian government, extremely close cooperation on

counterterrorism with Khartoum, and occasional but spectacular forays into Somalia in the hope of killing or capturing al Qaeda suspects.

Ethiopia has been the United States' closest ally in the Greater Horn for the last decade, partly because the fight against Islamic extremism resonates powerfully with Ethiopian officials. Although the country is half Muslim and half Christian, its political and intellectual elites have historically been Christian. Ethiopia has also suffered firsthand from Islamist terrorism: radicals based in Sudan plotted an assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in the capital, Addis Ababa, in 1995, and the Somalia-based al-Itihaad al-Islamiya has repeatedly staged attacks throughout the country. In 2001, the Bush administration declared Ethiopia the United States' principal counterterrorism ally in the region. Even the U.S. Agency for International Development -- which gave Ethiopia over \$460 million in food aid and assistance in fiscal year 2005 -- touts the country as being "of strategic importance to the United States because of its geographic position" and as "the linchpin to stability in the Horn of Africa and the Global War on Terrorism."

But Washington's narrow agenda has stifled U.S. efforts to press for more democracy and greater respect for human rights in Ethiopia. And it has undermined attempts to settle the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. In 1998, with full support from the State Department, the Defense Department, and the National Security Council, former National Security Adviser Anthony Lake led the multilateral efforts that eventually ended the Eritrean-Ethiopian war in 2000. But when Ethiopia started balking at implementing the 2002 border decision, rather than pursue diplomatic efforts to pressure it, the Bush White House did little, allowing its counterterrorism objectives to override peacemaking. The two states have barely budged in the five years since, and the Eritrean government has grown deeply skeptical of the international community's intentions. From its point of view, the border issue has been settled and Ethiopia must be held to account before negotiations on other questions can begin. While the stalemate lasts, U.S.-Eritrean relations sour: Washington now sees Isaias as unreliable and worries he is becoming friendlier to rogue states such as Iran, and Isaias continues to fume at what he considers to be favoritism toward Meles.

A second focus of the Bush administration's policy in the Greater Horn has been close cooperation on counterterrorism with Sudan. Khartoum's move away from its strong support for international terrorism started during the Clinton administration. From 1991 to 1996, bin Laden resided in Sudan, and the regime allowed numerous terrorists to travel on Sudanese passports and establish training camps on Sudanese soil. But then, in 1996, in response to U.S.-led sanctions by the UN Security Council, Khartoum expelled bin Laden and dismantled al Qaeda's camps and commercial infrastructure. Relations deteriorated in the summer of 1998, when Washington retaliated for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania by blowing up a Sudanese factory that it alleged stored biological weapons. And they improved somewhat again after the attacks of 9/11, which reinforced Washington's emphasis on counterterrorism and prompted the Bush administration to engage more with Khartoum.

The Bush White House, which was eager to respond to conservative Christian constituents who were demanding an end to human rights abuses and religious persecution in southern Sudan, also intensified its support for a peace deal there. But as the SPLA and the NCP were closing in on an agreement in 2003, Darfur blew up, exposing the weakness of the narrow approach of Washington and its partners. At that point, the U.S. government had to decide whether to continue to press for peace in the south or broaden its effort to also respond aggressively to the escalating crisis in Darfur. It chose the first option for fear that choosing (and failing at) the second would jeopardize both peace between the NCP and the SPLA and Khartoum's cooperation on counterterrorism. By doing so, however, Washington unwittingly gave the Sudanese government the upper hand: Sudanese officials realized that they could delay a deal with the SPLA while underwriting brutalities in Darfur without facing serious consequences. In both October 2003 and April 2004, even as Sudanese armed forces and the Janjaweed were massacring civilians in Darfur, the White House reported to Congress that Khartoum was negotiating "in good faith" with the SPLA.

President George W. Bush and senior U.S. officials have spoken out against the crimes in Darfur (they have called them genocide), and a UN panel has blamed them in part on senior NCP officials, including the director of national intelligence, the minister of the interior, and the minister of defense. But thanks partly to increased cooperation with Washington on intelligence, Khartoum has managed to avoid punitive action, stifle diplomatic efforts to reach durable

settlements with the rebels, and resist international efforts to send a robust peacekeeping force to Darfur. Last November, the Bush administration clearly stated that if Sudan did not agree by the end of the year to welcome a mixed force of UN and African Union (AU) troops to Darfur, Khartoum would face unspecified measures. But when the deadline came and went, the Bush administration issued no condemnation. Meanwhile, Khartoum has continued to cultivate its image as a counterterrorism partner -- even as hard-liners in the NCP have been reconnecting with old terrorist allies. All along, the NCP's objective in cooperating on terrorism has been to make itself indispensable to Washington in order to lessen its exposure to international pressure over its human rights record. And it has succeeded: despite a vast grass-roots movement in the United States calling for a robust response to the atrocities in Darfur, no viable plan is forthcoming yet.

U.S. policy in Somalia has also been dangerously narrow. Washington intervened there as part of a UN humanitarian mission in 1992, but it quickly got bogged down and, following the killing of 18 U.S. troops in the streets of Mogadishu, withdrew all U.S. forces in 1994. Since then, its main goal has been to apprehend the foreign al Qaeda operatives it believes are being hidden and protected by Somali Islamists. (One suspected protector is Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys, a one-time member of al-Itihaad al-Islamiya and now the chair of the Islamic courts.) To that end, Washington has funded Somali warlords to pursue terrorists on its behalf. By 2006, the enlisted warlords were calling themselves the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism -- and getting, according to our interviews with some members, about \$150,000 a month from Washington. In contrast, the United States contributed only \$250,000 to the \$10 million peace process that led to the formation of the Transitional Federal Government, and the United States gives far less humanitarian assistance to Somalia than to other countries in the region. The Bush administration has preferred to create a strategic partnership with warlords in the pursuit of a few terrorists rather than to address Somalia's chronic statelessness, which will continue to draw many more terrorists to the country.

Although Ethiopia's intervention this winter dislodged the potentially hostile Islamic courts -- which can be considered a short-term counterterrorism success -- it is too early for Washington to roll out the "Mission Accomplished" banners. Ethiopia's invasion has only displaced the most visible part of the Islamist movement; other elements have survived, including a network of

mosques, madrasahs, and businesses, as well as a militant wing, known as the Shabaab, that has threatened to wage guerrilla war. Meanwhile, the courts' collapse has left a huge vacuum that the transitional government cannot fill. The courts had brought peace and stability, and their defeat has returned Mogadishu to the warlords who have preyed on Somalia for much of the past two decades. Two related insurgencies are likely to break out in the future, one led by the remnants of the courts, the other by disaffected clans.

This leaves the United States' interests in Somalia at risk. Having pursued the narrow objective of capturing or killing a few terrorist suspects, Washington has now become embroiled in Ethiopia's policies in Somalia, which may diverge significantly from its own in the long run. Focusing on hunting down suspects without also investing in state building is a strategy that could not have worked, and the decision to support Ethiopia's military invasion without devising a broader political strategy was a stunning mistake, especially considering the U.S. experience in Iraq. Predictably, resentment over foreign intervention has been building among Somalis. And U.S. air strikes against Islamist holdouts in the far south of the country have turned Somalia into a much more interesting target for al Qaeda than it once was; they could boost recruiting for the Islamists for a long time.

### A THREE-PART PLAN

A new framework for engagement in the Greater Horn is urgently needed to reverse these trends. The United States' counterterrorism objectives would be best served by a new comprehensive diplomatic initiative focused on resolving conflict and promoting good governance throughout the region. Any new strategy must be wide-ranging and multilateral. It must focus all at once on resolving conflicts, keeping the peace, and punishing spoilers, and it will require working with the UN Security Council and the AU.

First, the United States should launch a Greater Horn peace initiative with the AU and the new UN secretary-general to devise a comprehensive approach to the two main clusters of conflicts surrounding Sudan and Somalia. This should entail coordinated efforts to resolve the related crises in Darfur, Chad, and the Central African Republic; secure a deal between the Lord's Resistance Army and the Ugandan government; broker a power-sharing arrangement in Somalia;

and settle the ongoing disputes in southern Sudan and between Ethiopia and Eritrea, in order to see the two existing peace deals concerning them fully implemented. These efforts would require the creation of a conflict resolution cell in the region, staffed by senior diplomats reporting to the State Department and assigned for at least one year, who would coordinate peace talks and support their realization. This initiative could follow the models provided by the partnership between the United States, the United Kingdom, Norway, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development that ended the war in southern Sudan and the partnership between the United States, the European Union, and the Organization of African Unity (the AU's predecessor) that ended the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Unfortunately, so far, in both Somalia and Darfur, the international community has put the cart before the horse, working furiously to send peacekeeping forces before having secured viable peace agreements.

Second, a concerted effort must be made to boost the peacekeeping capacity that would be needed to implement any peace deals. The United States and the European Union have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the past decade to prepare African armies to participate more effectively in peacekeeping operations. But judging by the limitations of the AU operations in Darfur, peacekeeping objectives need to be refocused. Lacking an explicit mandate to protect civilians, the AU troops in Darfur have often been either irrelevant or counterproductive, serving as a lightning rod for local hostility and as an excuse for the inaction of the international community. The AU does not have enough forces to deploy in multiple theaters; it could barely scrape together the 7,500 troops it sent to Darfur. And with Western donors failing to fully fund the mission, the troops were ill equipped and remained unpaid for months. The inescapable conclusion from the AU's experience in Darfur is that the UN should lead peacekeeping operations in Africa (as it does elsewhere in the world), with substantial AU participation and a mandate to protect civilians.

Third, Washington must do a better job of garnering international support for using, or at least threatening to use, multilateral penalties of some type. In Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia, the U.S. government and some Western states have offered much and gained little in return, partly because they have failed to apply instruments of pressure; they are like barking dogs with no bite. Real leverage comes from the early use of multilateral punitive measures -- such as prosecutions by the International Criminal Court, targeted sanctions against senior officials and

rebels, and oil embargoes and other instruments of economic pressure -- and from their suspension when compliance is achieved. How can the regime in Khartoum be expected to act any differently in Darfur if its activities bear no cost?

## WALKING THE WALK

Boosting conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and punitive measures will unquestionably be difficult, but it can be done if the United States builds multilateral partnerships to share the diplomatic and financial burdens. In Sudan, this will require preventing the NCP from continuing to channel U.S. policies into separate streams -- one on southern Sudan, another on Darfur, another still on counterterrorism. Washington needs a cohesive Sudan policy that addresses all U.S. goals simultaneously and uses multilateral punitive actions to achieve them. Until the power-sharing agreement is fully implemented in the south and wealth and power devolve from the ruling elites in Khartoum to marginalized areas in Darfur and the east, the tensions that have fueled 50 years of civil war in Sudan will not subside.

Despite its flaws, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in southern Sudan remains a key building block for altering the distribution of power and reestablishing democracy throughout the country -- but only if it is fully implemented. Enforcement means overcoming several major obstacles: the NCP's failure to demobilize its proxy militia forces in southern Sudan, its refusal to accept a border commission's ruling regarding the oil-producing region of Abyei, and the lack of transparency in the division of oil revenues between the Government of National Unity in Khartoum and the Government of Southern Sudan in Juba. NCP hard-liners simply will not implement key elements of the agreement -- or abandon their militaristic policies in Darfur -- unless Western governments subject them to the coordinated pressure of UN sanctions, asset freezes, and criminal indictments.

At the same time, the United States and other donors must live up to their commitment to help build the capacity of the nascent Government of Southern Sudan. International donors pledged \$4.5 billion for Sudan at a conference following the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Oslo in May 2005, but they did not fulfill their obligations fully because of mounting concern over Khartoum's role in the atrocities in Darfur. They must now refocus on the south to prevent a

return to conflict. And they must prepare for the increasing likelihood that the region will vote to secede in the 2011 referendum. Southern Sudanese participating in focus groups convened by the National Democratic Institute in April 2006 expressed near-total support for independence. With little progress in their relations with Khartoum, it is unlikely that southerners will change their minds in the next four years. But Khartoum will probably return to war rather than allow the referendum to occur and risk losing access to 80 percent of its oil resources. More focused international support for the Government of Southern Sudan, especially for helping the SPLA become a regular army, would not only decrease insecurity in the south in the run-up to the referendum but also help deter the NCP from resuming the conflict (or at least give southerners the means to defend themselves if it did).

With Sudan's oil revenues up to \$4 billion a year, Khartoum is now driven more by greed than by Islamist ideology. This presents an opportunity for the United States to increase economic pressure on Khartoum. But Washington cannot make the most of this without engaging more deeply with China and Arab League countries, which have strong economic interests in Sudan and regularly run interference for the regime. In response to U.S. economic sanctions in the 1990s, the Sudanese oil sector established close ties with China and, to a lesser extent, with Malaysia and India; as a result, Beijing is now reluctant to lean on Khartoum.

But the growing perception that Beijing is turning a blind eye to continuing atrocities in Darfur could mar its international image as it prepares to host the 2008 Olympics. Recent efforts to build consensus among China, Russia, and the Arab League for enhancing peacekeeping forces in Darfur are a good start. But it is also necessary to build multilateral support for a comprehensive peace strategy that would force Khartoum to stop supporting rebel groups in Chad and the Central African Republic, negotiate amendments to the flawed Darfur Peace Agreement, and accept a properly mandated international peacekeeping force -- with UN troops under UN command and control -- to protect civilians and dismantle the Janjaweed. The United States should work through the UN Security Council to freeze the assets of senior NCP officials and their businesses and impose travel bans on them, as well as facilitate the flow of information about suspected war criminals to the International Criminal Court. In case the situation deteriorates and Khartoum continues to obstruct peace efforts, the international community

should urgently plan for deploying ground and air forces to protect civilians without Khartoum's consent.

In Somalia, too, a multilateral approach to peace building is necessary to prevent protracted insurgencies from engulfing the region. There has been little history of sectarian violence in Ethiopia, but many Ethiopians now worry that an extended war with Somali Islamists could create religious divisions at home, pitting, in particular, Muslims against the government. Rather than relying primarily on military force, regular intelligence from and occasional intervention by Ethiopia, anti-Islamist warlords, and a weak transitional government, as it has done, Washington must adopt a more nuanced approach to Somalia. It should work with the European Union, the AU, the Arab League, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to pressure all parties into negotiating a power-sharing deal between the transitional government, clan leaders in Mogadishu, and the Islamic courts. The Somali transitional government will negotiate only if pressed by Ethiopia, and the United States has more clout with Ethiopia than does any other external actor. By contrast, Washington lacks direct leverage with the Islamic courts and excluded clan elders, and so U.S. diplomacy on that front should focus on getting governments in the region and in the Arab League to persuade them to accept a government of national unity.

None of this will be easy. Washington must appoint full-time envoys to press for a power-sharing deal in Somalia and to nudge Ethiopia and Eritrea toward accommodation. Letting these disputes fester would ensure the advent of Islamist and clan-based insurgencies in Somalia and increase the possibility of another war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Both developments would be disastrous for the people of the Greater Horn and for long-term U.S. counterterrorism objectives.

The essential lesson of U.S. counterterrorism policy over the last five years -- apparently unheeded by the Bush administration -- is that in order for local Muslim populations to take the United States' counterterrorism agenda seriously, the United States must take their state-building and power-sharing agendas seriously, too. Ironically, the strategy is already there on paper. In its 2002 National Security Strategy and elsewhere, the Bush administration has argued that failing states foster terrorism and has laid out a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism that involves promoting peace building, state reconstruction, and good governance. When it comes to

the Greater Horn, however, the Bush administration has simply not implemented its own policies. By relying on sporadic military strikes and continued support for autocrats without broader political planning, it has combined the worst elements of its current strategy in Iraq with the Cold War-era policy of cronyism. Conflict resolution and good governance are, in fact, the keys to countering terrorism in the Greater Horn over the long term. Failing to recognize this will likely result in hundreds of thousands more deaths, billions of dollars more spent on emergency humanitarian aid -- and the increased prospect of another terrorist attack against U.S. interests in the region. With a few more dollars spent on preventive diplomacy, these outcomes could be avoided altogether.

#### **4.6 The Effectiveness of the US- Ethiopia counters terrorism strategies in the Horn of Africa**

According to meharitadele After the fanfare accorded to the United States President Barack Obama by Kenya, the last stop was Ethiopia. Of grand symbolic importance, Obama's visit to East Africa was clearly historic, as he is the first sitting US president to do so. A source of infectious excitement, Obama is extraordinarily popular and despite the various inconveniences and disruptions to their daily activities, Ethiopians have been delighted to welcome him to their country.

While visiting Ethiopia's capitol city, Addis Ababa, Obama addressed both the Ethiopian government and the African Union. His presence in the region is a reflection of just how far East Africa, and particularly Ethiopia, has progressed in addressing their various misfortunes.

##### **Dealing with terrorism**

Security cooperation is an area of high interest for the US in Africa. Obama has repeatedly expressed his administration's keen interest in learning from Ethiopia's counterterrorism (CT) efforts and its counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy, which I call the "Ethiopian Doctrine" on CT and COIN.

Attesting to this fact, Obama said: Obviously the US and Ethiopia have been talking a lot about terrorism and the focus has been on ISIL the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, but in Somalia, we've seen al-Shabab, an affiliate of al-Qaeda, wreak havoc throughout that country."

He continued: "That's an area where the cooperation and leadership on the part of Ethiopia is making a difference as we speak So, our counterterrorism cooperation and the partnerships that we have formed with countries like Ethiopia are going to be critical to our overall efforts to defeat terrorism." For many experts closely following events in the Horn of Africa and the fight against terrorism, Ethiopia stands out as having been exceptionally successful.

## **Supremacy of politics**

The Ethiopian Doctrine on CT and COIN differs from others in several highly related respects:

The first element refers to supremacy of politics over the military components of the CT and COIN strategies. Under the Ethiopian Doctrine, politics precedes and leads the military and criminal justice systems. Traditional military-led COIN and CT strategies (including peacekeeping missions) cripplingly depend on the expeditionary army, whereas the Ethiopian Doctrine focuses on liberating areas for local communities to organise, arm themselves, and fight back against terrorists.

It also focuses on traditional narratives of solidarity, thereby promoting credible voices and messages of hope against despair.

Additionally, the counterinsurgency soldiers must always follow and support the political and civilian officers. Thus, political work and community development advances before military operations.

## **Subsidiarity principle**

The political work involves mainly consultation with local communities and helping them in organising and arming themselves in order to fight back against threats. A soldier has a place in CT and COIN, but only in a subsidiary role to the political officer. By adapting aspects of the Ethiopian Doctrine to local peculiarities, other regions could not only alienate the leadership of the terrorist organisations but could also offer opportunity and space for local community-based mobilisation of CT and COIN strategies.

The role of political and civilian officers cannot be replaced by a soldier or military representative. It is not a quick-fix solution, but instead, seeks to gradually weaken violent extremism by engraining anti-insurgency into the very local cultural attributes and historical legacies of toleration of societies that comprise Ethiopia.

Trust-building, understanding fears, and sharing a common vision is at the centre of this approach, but more importantly, it embraces the principle of subsidiarity that requires that any and all external actors should be backup supporters of efforts by internal forces and local communities in the fight against terrorism. This approach also helps to build close-knit neighbourhood associations that provide community-based peace and security with effective oversight by the state. Such a commonality makes it very difficult for both foreign and domestic extremist groups to establish themselves and operate clandestinely within communities.

### **Pockets of stability and sustenance**

Another element relates to seeking peace and national unity through the gradual expansion of pockets of stability, legitimacy, law, and order. While traditional anti-insurgency strategies focus on controlling territories and populations, the Ethiopian Doctrine focuses on public deliberations, training, arming, and establishing administrative units in liberated areas to ensure their own peace and security. It is a gradualist approach. For example, beginning with the liberation of Somalia's capital Mogadishu, and then working outwards to liberate and secure more surrounding territory through community-based outreach.

Moreover, this strategy relates to the governance and delivery of basic services in order to build hope within communities and security to sustain their own livelihoods. It aims at drying the swamps of poverty and unrest that breed violent extremism. Basically, this approach kills the problem at its source, before it spreads and expands beyond control.

### **Mobile military command posts**

The last, and arguably the most profound aspect of Ethiopian Doctrine is that it recognises that there is no military solution to terrorism and insurgency. That being said, it doesn't eliminate it from the equation. It simply acknowledges that the military is not the most important factor.

It prioritises a greater use of mobile field headquarters and command centres meshed in the community - centres that are primarily designed to support the local communities in their efforts against terrorism and to provide extra muscle when their efforts are outgunned by the enemy.

In traditional anti-insurgency strategies, these mobile military operations would be pushing aggressive offensive measures and become static and easy targets for terrorist force. By adapting aspects of the Ethiopian Doctrine to local peculiarities, other regions facing chaotic security regimes could not only alienate the leadership of the terrorist organisations but could also offer opportunity and space for local community-based mobilisation of CT and COIN strategies.

Expansive and indiscriminate bombings without the active participation of local communities and regional actors would provide for more grievance-based terrorism and will fail to be effective and sustainable in the long term.

## **4.7 THE Challenges of the US-Ethiopia counter terrorism strategies in the Horn of Africa**

Two major challenges now appear in the African and American responses to terrorism. Generally, many Africans and some American critics are very concerned that the new Africa Command and other U.S. anti-terrorism programs signal an increased militarization of U.S. policy in Africa. These critics argue that only a continual intensive attack on the root causes of

terrorism and violence, that is, poverty, authoritarianism, discrimination, weak states, and similar conditions, will effectively combat such threats. They contend that a focus that relies too heavily on security will encourage authoritarian practices and undermine Africa's move toward more democratic governance. The style and focus of the unified Africa Command will be a closely watched measure of whether the United States pursues its counterterrorism policies with the requisite sensitivity, breadth of programming, and balance that is required.

A second challenge relates to the continued ability of the Africa Union (AU) to provide leadership in conflict resolution and the timely provision of peacekeepers as it has done in recent years in Burundi, Darfur, and Côte d'Ivoire. The current debacle in Somalia may have dragged the AU into an untenable situation that could fundamentally undermine the promise of that organization as a force for peacemaking and improved governance. This occurs Reprinted by permission of WESTVIEW PRESS, a member of Perseus Books Group.

at the same time that the AU may experience diminishing support from Nigeria and perhaps South Africa, as leaders change in those countries. Should both of these factors prove to be the case, U.S. counterterrorism policies, especially in the Horn, will have had lasting negative effects on Africa's overall security.

### **Impact on U.S. Policy Objectives**

For the United States, cooperation with an authoritarian Ethiopia presents looming challenges to U.S. policy objectives. First, the Ethiopian government's attempts to minimize political competition in the run-up to the 2010 elections are likely to fan ethnic tensions in the country. The government's ruling party, the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), is perceived by many Ethiopians to be dominated by a single minority ethnic faction, the Tigre, and its consolidation of political power may be read as an assault on the majority ethnic Amharic and Oromo populations. Public dissatisfaction with the government is high in the wake of the 2005 elections and a violent explosion is not out of the question.

Second, Ethiopia's conflicts with Eritrea and Somalia, and with the powerful separatist movement in the Ogaden, have a jihadist impact. While the U.S.-Ethiopia alliance has had short-term tactical advantages, it may be undermining broader US counterterror goals.

Arguably, U.S. reliance on Ethiopian military might and intelligence has served to exacerbate instability in Somalia. Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia, and the extended presence of Ethiopian troops in Mogadishu, instead of quelling conflict, has triggered a local backlash that has served as a rallying point for local extremists. It was the development of a complex insurgency against the Ethiopian occupation that effectively catapulted a fringe jihadist youth militia, the Shabaab, to power. International jihadists have now capitalized on the local insurgency, and on U.S. support of the Ethiopian invasion, as an opportunity to globalize Somalia's conflict. The presence of foreign expertise, fighters, and funding has helped to tip the balance of power in favor of Somalia's extremist groups. Additionally, there is growing concern that the conflict in the Ogaden may give birth to indigenous jihadist movements.

While the U.S.-Ethiopia alliance has had short-term tactical advantages, it may be undermining broader U.S. counterterror goals.

Anti-American sentiment in Somalia is pervasive, and stems in large part from U.S. complicity with the Ethiopian invasion and reported Ethiopian human rights abuses in Somalia. Ethiopia has also reportedly engaged in human rights abuses within its Ogaden region, which borders Somalia, where the government is engaged in a counterinsurgency effort against an ethnic Somali separatist movement. Though Ethiopia has denied these charges, human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have documented atrocities committed by both sides in that conflict. The U.S. decision to withdraw its military personnel from the Ogaden in April 2006, and the subsequent failure of the international community to seek accountability for these atrocities, has cemented a widespread public perception in Ethiopia and Somalia that the United States is willing to turn a blind eye on human rights abuses in exchange for cooperation in the counterterror effort.

Further complicating U.S. efforts to bolster Somalia's central government is the unresolved border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Eritrea complains that Ethiopia has refused to honor the ruling of an independent border commission on the demarcation of the common boundary and has demanded intervention from the international community. Ethiopia charges that Eritrea has retaliated by funneling weapons and funding to radical groups in Somalia, some of which oppose Ethiopian forces there. Eritrea has denied these charges, and some specific accusations

leveled by the United Nations and the African Union against Eritrea have been disproven. The demand for sanctions on Eritrea is nevertheless growing, and comments by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton on a visit to Kenya on Aug. 6, in which she linked Eritrea to Somali militants suggests efforts by the Obama administration to engage in a constructive political dialogue with Asmara may be dimming.

These factors suggest that U.S. ability to influence events in Somalia will depend in some measure on diplomatic efforts to resolve the border dispute and to address Ethiopian human rights abuses. But perhaps even more important than either is what the United States decides to do in response to the shrinking democratic space in Ethiopia.

### **Obstacles to U.S. Action**

The United States has been unwilling to overtly pressure Ethiopia to adopt major democratic reforms for a number of reasons. Many experts and policymakers already fear that the regime is vulnerable to collapse. Some diplomats fear that aggressive--or even public--pressure on Ethiopia may inadvertently undermine or destabilize the regime. The United States cannot afford to unsettle a country that has served as a rock of stability in an otherwise troubled region.

Another major hurdle for the United States is the lack of an international consensus on one fundamental question: Is Ethiopia still a democratic country, or is the regime of President MelesZenawi headed towards dictatorship? The perception that Ethiopia is a fundamentally democratic country remains strong, particularly among European nations. The lack of any consensus would require the United States to take a lead and potentially isolated role in pressuring Ethiopia for reform.

Finally, U.S. efforts to promote democratic reform in Ethiopia are impeded by a lack of willing partners on the ground. Democratic civil society groups generally fear for their safety and are not willing to mobilize in a public advocacy effort. This means that U.S. efforts to counteract repressive measures by the government will not be supported--or legitimized--by a corresponding local effort. International organizations that might have engaged with opposition political voices have already been expelled from the country.

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